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INTRODUCTION

T

HE burgeoning online privacy debate is steeped in portentous
rhetoric borrowing heavily from George Orwell's Nineteen
Eighty-Four and Jeremy Bentham's Panopticon,' but these literary
and architectural metaphors egregiously misrepresent an already
confusing controversy? Commentators deploy these metaphors as
descriptive shorthand, but in so doing they both misrepresent the
contours of the problem and unfairly editorialize the description
itself. Traditional privacy metaphors are generally ill-equipped to
mediate our understanding of the way information changes hands
in cyberspace.4 In an attempt to capture the differences between
the current state of informational privacy and that of Orwell's totalitarian dystopia, some commentators have sought modern variants on traditional privacy metaphors.
The concept of "little brother" is one such variation invoked by
many to convey the private character of the "invasion." 5 Of equal

1George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four (Secker & Warburg 1987) (1949) (describinF a culture where all behavior is monitored by the state).
Jeremy Bentham, The Panopticon Writings (Miran Bozovic ed., Verso 1995)
(1791) (proposing plans for a progressive prison constructed such that all behavior
could be monitored easily by a single agent).
'See, e.g., McVeigh v. Cohen, 983 F. Supp. 215, 220 (D.D.C. 1998) ("In these days
of 'big brother,' where through technology and otherwise the privacy interests of individuals from all walks of life are being ignored or marginalized, it is imperative that
statutes explicitly protecting these rights be strictly observed."); Paul M. Schwartz,
Internet Privacy and the State, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 815, 853 (2000) ("The government's
Herculean efforts to make Internet technology open for snooping resemble such an
attempt to install the Panopticon."); Jonathan M. Winer, Regulating the Free Flow of
Information: A Privacy Czar as the Ultimate Big Brother, 19 J. Marshall J. Computer
& Info. L. 37, 68-70 (2000); William Branigin, Employment Database Proposal Raises
Cries of 'Big Brother,' Wash. Post, Oct. 3, 1995, at A17; James Gleick, Big Brother is
Us, N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1996, § 6 (Magazine), at 130. For an extensive discussion of
the use of the Orwell metaphor, see generally Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power:
Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 1393
(2001) (arguing in favor of using Kafka's The Trial as a metaphor for mediating our
understanding of online privacy).
' See Solove, supra note 3, at 1398-99.
'See, e.g., Justice Ben F. Overton & Katherine E. Giddings, The Right of Privacy in
Florida in the Age of Technology and the Twenty-First Century: A Need for Protection from Private and Commercial Intrusion, 25 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 25, 27 (1997) (ex-
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importance as the difference in the institutional source of surveillance is the absence of what Frank Zappa calls a "central scrutinizer."6 The Internet is not subject to monitoring by a single information collecting agent, and the overwhelming majority of those
entities that do monitor online activity are private companies.7 Of
all the online information collected by these private agents, often
referred to as "data miners," the vast majority consists of "cookie"
or "clickstream data"-data collected on users as they go about the
routine process of viewing web pages. To the extent that one may
characterize the transmission of clickstream data from users to data
miners as a market, the egregious information asymmetries between these two groups mean that, contrary to the implications of
the traditional Orwell metaphor, by correcting these market imperfections the government may figure prominently in protecting the
privacy of its citizens.
It is not the case that traditional privacy metaphors always distort the circumstances, but their expository appeal renders them a
convenient camouflage for complexity. A solution to any online
privacy problem must proceed from the understanding that an undesirable state of Internet privacy is not a monolithic species of
problem at all, but rather a genus of related problems with a common denominator: Each concerns what different agents may do
with information collected online. Some writers have a tendency to
recite endless series of anecdotes, seemingly oblivious to the fact
that the set of catalogued behavior shares only the property of having taken place at a computer.8 From context to context the ob-

plaining that invasions of privacy no longer come from only the government, but also
from various private commercial entities intent on making profits).
6The "central scrutinizer" is a character from one of Zappa's albums that serves to
parody central censorship agents. Frank Zappa, Central Scrutinizer, on Joe's Garage
(Rykodisc USA 1979).
'Over 1000 companies are engaged in compiling comprehensive online databases.
See Mike Hatch, The Privatization of Big Brother: Protecting Sensitive Personal Information from Commercial Interests in the 21st Century, 27 Win. Mitchell L. Rev.
1457, 1470-71 (2001).
8 See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Our Data, Ourselves: Privacy, Propertization, and Gender,
34 U.S.F. L. Rev. 633, 645-46 (2000) (describing a scenario where computerized
medical records are linked up to advertising data and email addresses); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1283, 1306-08
(2000); Paul Rose, A Market Response to the European Union Directive on Privacy,
4 UCLA J. Int'l L. & Foreign Aff. 445, 455-65 (1999); Karl D. Belgum, Who Leads at
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servers and the observed exhibit wildly different levels of technical
sophistication, contractual expectations, and bargaining power.
This Note will address only one such context, the collection of
clickstream data and the legal rules that should govern it. The focus is not arbitrary, however, as the clickstream data problem lends
itself least to resolution by controversial philosophical principles
and exhibits a commercial character rendering it particularly inviting for economic analysis. The Note will argue that the underlying
objectives of any legal posture towards clickstream privacy are incompatible with a prophylactic standard of behavior and will propose a scheme that, using modern browser technology, assigns to
each party (the user and the collecting agent) a certain set of default rights around which the two parties may bargain. The model
would further protect user interests by incorporating, for the
browser-negotiated privacy term, a user reservation price that
would operate much like a liquid damages clause in the event of a
breach. Although the model is presented as a case study of the
clickstream privacy problem, many of the following arguments may
be brought to bear on other modern contexts where privacy concerns coexist with important markets for information.
Part I will suggest a framework for analyzing privacy invasions
and will clarify the scope of the activity to which the subsequent
analysis applies. Part II will argue that while the concept of "information markets" remains inappropriate in some contexts, it is
the best way to conceptualize and address clickstream data collection. Part III will explore the specific market failures in the clickstream context. Part IV will explain why existing privacy doctrines
are unable to address the problem. Part V will argue that the
plummeting transaction costs associated with developments in
browser technology render a legal paradigm of default entitlements
a viable option for mediating the clickstream data market. Part VI
will contend that, in addition to specific default entitlements, clickstream data exchange should involve a default schedule of expectancy damages.

Halftime?: Three Conflicting Visions of Internet Privacy Policy, 6 Rich. J.L. & Tech.
1, T$ 6-16 (2000), at http://www.law.richmond.edu/jolt/v6il/belgum.html (on file with
the Virginia Law Review Association).
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I. COOKIES AND CLICKSTREAM DATA

A. A Framework for Analysis
At this point, it may be useful to conceptualize a state of informational privacy as a tripartite equilibrium among the observed,
the collecting agent, and the searching agent.' Many times the collecting agent and the searching agent will be the same entity, and
such a condition is what people usually think of as "surveillance.""
Broadly speaking, informational privacy protects some right to
control and condition the revelation of personal information to
other entities." Part II argues that this right does not imply an entitlement to control how one is treated or perceived by those to
whom one divulges the information. 2 Almost all of the practices
that implicate informational privacy (even offline) can be represented by some discrete combination of three attributes: (1) the ac-

Professor Lawrence Lessig has extensively discussed the relationship between privacy and the costs associated with monitoring and search. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig,
Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 18-19 (1999). To this author's knowledge, however, no one has used these concepts to construct an analytically precise means of
classifying different privacy concerns. It has been suggested, however, that one could
think about privacy in terms of the individuals about whom data is being gathered or
in terms of who is doing the gathering. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1461, 1468 (2000).
'0Surveillance is not always described in these terms, but most situations we consider to be surveillance involve an entity collecting information for its own use.
"See Jeffrey Rosen, The Unwanted Gaze: The Destruction of Privacy in America 8
(2001) ("Privacy protects us from being misdefined and judged out of context in a
world of short attention spans, a world in which information can easily be confused
with knowledge."); Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom 7 (1967) ("Privacy is the
claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when, how,
and to what extent information about them is communicated to others.").
"This conception of informational privacy would go further and suggest that the
observed approve secondary exchanges between an entity that already "knows"
something and another that seeks to learn it, even if the initial exchange between the
observed and the first entity was not conditioned upon such subsequent consent. See,
e.g., Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 Stan. L. Rev.
1049, 1050 (2000) (characterizing informational privacy as "[one person's] right to
control [another person's] communication of personally identifiable information
about [him or her]").
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tivity in which the observed is engaged, (2) the identity of the collecting agent, and (3) the identity of the searching agent.
The Video Privacy Protection Act 4 is nicknamed the "Bork Bill"
because the legislation reflected the public outcry over the ease
with which a reporter acquired the embattled jurist's video records. 5 The above framework would represent this practice as (1)
renting video tapes (the activity), (2) the video store (the collecting
agent), and (3) a reporter (the searching agent).
While connected to the Internet, the observed (an Internet user)
may do any number of things that serve as a data point for collecting and searching agents: send an email, post messages in a chatroom, view a web page, download a piece of software, register for
a service, or purchase a product. Collecting and searching agents
may be employers, private companies, other people, or the government. An undesirable privacy state generally occurs when certain instances of one attribute coincide with certain instances of
others. The term "attribute" refers to the variables (1), (2), and (3)
themselves, and the term "instance" refers to a potential value for
that variable. For example, an attribute is the property of having an
agent of data collection itself and an instance of that attribute
could be a website, an advertiser who places an ad on that page, an
employer, or the government.
While in an Orwellian state the government is both the collecting and the searching agent, on the Internet its activity is generally
limited to that of the latter. 6 This circumstance notwithstanding,
people remain extremely concerned any time the government is
the searching agent. Whether law restrains the government from
acting as such generally depends on the circumstances. For example, prosecutors may use phone records to link names to Internet
Protocol ("IP") addresses collected while users are on child por-

'3This framework is merely general. Specific invasions would require variables that
described, among other things, the time of the invasion and the exact identity (rather
than the class) of persons both being observed and doing the collecting.

"18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2000).

ISSee Elbert Lin, Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1085, 1148 n.430 (2002).
"There are certain exceptions. For example, the government surely collects data in
.gov domains. Offline, the most obvious instance of the government as the collecting
agent is when it acquires census data.
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nography sites," but the government does not enjoy unfettered access to the content of email transmissions.18
People are also suspicious of employers acting as searching
agents, a circumstance that is the source of much discussion as
companies routinely collect and search, among other things, the
email and web-surfing histories of their employees.'9 That employers may monitor email and web surfing to promote productivity
and protect against industrial espionage has become more of a fact
of life than a controversy," and employers would likely contract
around any default rule to the contrary. Employers are rarely collecting agents without also being searching agents and there is a
straight-forward rationale for why: Entities that are the former but
not the latter generally subsist on selling data about the things they
observe, and the profit derived from selling the web-surfing habits
of its workforce is not worth the associated diminution in job appeal to potential employees. Regardless of its economic justification, many find employer surveillance objectionable because it
represents an uninvited source of behavior modification.
People also become upset when they discover that they have
been observed without notice. Several years ago Intel ignited a
firestorm when the public learned that it embedded a unique identifier in each Pentium III chip, allowing the company to collect information about what its customers were doing on the Internet.2 A
" See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1083, 1143-44 (2002).
'"The Federal Wiretap Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000), restricts government access to the content of emails by requiring judicial issuance of a warrant in
certain circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)(ii)(A)-(B) (2000).
1"See Lessig, supra note 9, at 145 (noting that the greatest invasion of privacy in cyberspace is employee-monitoring by companies); Rosen, supra note 11, at 160-62 (detailing the ease with which systems administrators can observe the online behavior of
employees).
20See Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Jeffrey
Rosen, 89 Geo. L.J. 2029, 2031-32 (2001) [hereinafter Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and
Technology] (arguing that employers monitor to structure investment risk in their
employees); Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig's Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy Control, and Fair Information Practices, 2000 Wis. L. Rev. 743,
770-71 (citing Jeffrey L. Seglin, As Office Snooping Grows, Who Watches the
Watchers?, N.Y. Times, June 18, 2000, at BU4).
" See Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J. Sci.
& Tech. L. 288, 294, 298 (2001); Frank James, Intel Chip Fires up Privacy Debate,
Chi. Trib., Jan. 22, 1999, at 1.
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conceptually similar example of this type of invasion occurred
when RealNetworks allowed surfers to download its RealJukebox
audio product from its website.2 RealNetworks, in turn, used a
unique identifier embedded in the RealJukebox software to collect
information about its customers' musical proclivities.23
Finally, people object not only to instance-attribute combinations involving specific searching agents but also to the manner in
which these agents use the data. This is the "fourth attribute" violation. The "fourth attribute" refers to a representation of a privacy violation that includes, as one of its primary dimensions, what
a searching agent does with the data. Properly understood, however, these types of objections do not relate to informational privacy at all. It borders on tautology to note that an entity compromises informational privacy when it reveals private information.
When people object to receiving unsolicited emails or being dehumanized by advertising that treats them categorically,24 however,
their objection does not stem from the information revelation itself, but the use of that information. This activity, however, is
closer to harassment than to an informational privacy violation.
The public mistakenly analyzes the "fourth attribute" problem (in
the clickstream context) as one of informational privacy for two
reasons.
The first derives from faulty analogical reasoning. Many controversial uses of data result in users receiving unsolicited email. Because of the obvious analogy to real mail and real mailboxes, people tend to think of the receipt of unsolicited email in the same
privacy terms as they think of unsolicited real mail. The analogy is
surely warranted, and "junk mail" may well implicate a privacy interest. That privacy interest, however, is not informational. It is
closer to the cluster of privacy interests that relate to being free
from physical invasions or harassment at home." The second
" See Lawrence Jenab, Will the Cookie Crumble?: An Analysis of Internet Privacy
Regulatory Schemes Proposed in the 106th Congress, 49 U. Kan. L. Rev. 641, 662
(2001); Christopher D. Hunter, Recording the Architecture of Cyberspace Privacy:
Why Self-Regulation and Technology Are Not Enough, at http://www.asc.upenn.edu
/usr/chunter/net-privacy-architecture.html (Feb. 2000) (on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association).
23 See Hunter, supra note 22.
24See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 8, at 653-56.
2' See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
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source of confusion resides in the character of the economic causeand-effect relationship. The ability to send junk mail and to deliver
customized advertisements to consumers creates a significant demand for personal information. The market's response to this demand may compromise informational privacy, but the mailing and
advertising themselves do not. Consequently, proscribing such behavior may be a means of vitiating the demand for informational
privacy violations, but this does not mean the demand-inducing activity itself represents a violation.
Clickstream data collection superficially exhibits almost none of
the qualities associated with typical claims about informational privacy and therefore represents a relatively novel problem. The government certainly acts as a searching agent, but for only a small
fraction of the time, and lawmakers may easily proscribe such
searches by enacting legislation. Employers monitor employee
clickstreams,26 but such monitoring is generally accepted as an economic necessity." Moreover, most people are aware that their
clickstream is collected,' and it is the absence of restrictions on
such collection that animates much popular concern. 9 Finally, that
searching agents use clickstream data for targeting is not a complaint about informational privacy at all. Further analysis of clickstream privacy requires a deeper understanding of the data exchange itself.
B. Characteristicsof ClickstreamData
The most robust online databases store huge amounts of clickstream data collected using cookies to identify individual computers." The vast majority of web interactions consist merely of a
user downloading a web page, at which point a website operator
(publisher) will write to that computer a tiny machine-readable
26See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
In one survey, eighty-eight percent of respondents at least had some notion of
what a cookie was. Lorrie Faith Cranor et al., Beyond Concern: Understanding Net
Users' Attitudes About Online Privacy (AT&T Labs, Research Technical Report TR
99.4.3, 1999), at http://www.research.att.com/resources/trs/TRs/99/99.4/99.4.3/
report.htm (Apr. 14, 1999) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
28

9

See id.

"0See Solove, supra note 3, at 1411-12.
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text file, called a cookie." The cookie will contain some identifier
(this can be anonymous, like an ID number, or non-anonymous,
like a name) as well as other pieces of information that allow the
publisher both to personalize treatment of that user and to collect
information about that user's behavior on the site.32 A cookie may
therefore also contain a zip code, an IP address, a favorite color, or
an indication of a preference for golf over tennis. On this author's
computer, in the folder C:\WINDOWS\COOKIES, there are currently 953 such text files. Clickstream data is the information collecting agents store about the cookies that send requests to their
servers:3
A page view is a transaction, and understanding why this is so is
crucial to the process of identifying the privacy interests involved
in the clickstream context. 4 When a user downloads a web page,
she is effectively requesting content from a server.35 When she
types a URL address into her web browser, she is requesting content residing at that location (that is why it is called an address).36
During the process of transmitting the information, in most instances the content server will either (1) read a cookie it has previously written to a specified directory in a user's computer, or (2)
write a new cookie if one is not already there. 7 The cookie will
contain information allowing the content server to customize user
treatment based either on things that she has requested or on a
profile of her cookie history.38
There are three important things to remember about cookies.
First, cookies confer benefits upon users at the same time that they
allow collecting agents to extract information from them. Cookies
allow publishers to personalize user experience and to collect cer-

" For a general technical description of how collecting agents use cookies to track
clickstreams, see Jenab, supra note 22, at 645-46.
32 Id.
3 See Solove, supra note 3, at 1411.
See Jenab, supra note 22, at 643 ("The first and fundamental point to clarify is
that all Internet activity is transactional.").
" Id. The distinction between "content" and "e-commerce" sites is not important
here; a user always sees "content," in the sense of information sent from server to
browser,
even if the user is purchasing something.
36
1 Id.at 643-44.
.'See also id. at 645 (describing this process for third-party advertisers).
38See Solove, supra note 3, at 1411.
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tain data about user behavior.39 Second, for simplicity's sake this
Note has thus far implied that only first-party content servers can
place a cookie on a user's computer, but other third parties, generally advertisers or affiliates, may do so as well."° Third, this information may or may not be collected anonymously.4 Generally
cookies from third-party advertisers (entities that serve their clients' advertisements into designated spaces on publisher pages)
will not contain personally identifiable information but will associate the information with a unique, but anonymous, identifier. 2
The invisible yet highly technical character of the exchange often
means that even if a user knows that a collecting agent is observing
her, she may not know the identity of such agents, the identities of
potential searching agents, or the potential uses to which the
searches may be put. If she could condition her data transfer on
adherence to certain expectations about these unknowns, she
might consent to some of them but not to others. The seamlessness
of the data collection allows collecting agents to take advantage of
users that do not know that it is happening, and the presence of
uncertainty regarding what may be done with the data overdeters
Internet use by those who do know. "3

"' See Rita Heimes, Foreword to Susan Richey et al., Internet Privacy Law, Policy,
and Practice: State, Federal, and International Perspectives, 54 Me. L. Rev. 95, 95
(2002); infra note 223 and accompanying text.
" See Jenab, supra note 22, at 645-46; Rachel K. Zimmerman, The Way the "Cookies" Crumble: Internet Privacy and Data Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 4
N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol'y 439, 444 (2000); Hilary Appelman, Ratings That Know
What You're Looking at, and When, N.Y. Times, june 7, 2000, at H37; Peter H.
Lewis, Battling Cookie Monsters, N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 2000, at G1.
" Anonymity is a matter of degree, however, and there remain at least two ways
anonymous cookies may allow collecting agents to identify users. First, cookies can be
cross-referenced with other login information in the collecting agent's database to link
behavior with personal information. Second, other information in cookies can be
cross-referenced with data in other marketing databases. See Helms, supra note 21, at
297-98.
42 An "anonymous" cookie is one that does not use any personal information, to determine which material to send to a user's browser. See, e.g., DoubleClick Privacy
Policy, at http://www.doubleclick.com/us/corporate/privacy/privacy/default.asp?aspobject-l=& (last updated June 17, 2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) ("No personal information is used by DoubleClick to deliver Internet ads.").
"' One may fairly object that in some instances it is better "not to know" or not to
have to choose a course of action because the costs of acquiring information or of
choosing respectively are so great. Parts III, V, and VI deal largely with this proposi-
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Using this Note's syntax, the instances of the first two attributes
in the clickstream context are (1) loading a web page and (2) first
and third parties that serve information into that page. What is objectionable about clickstream data collection is not an undesirable
combination of attributes, but instead the inability to create certainty in a transaction for information. The next Part attempts to
place this concern, the inability to condition information exchange
on certain behavior, in a broader philosophical context.
II.

CLICKSTREAM DATA AND PRIVACY

A. Watching Clickstreams
The right of privacy is hardly a model of deontic precision." Philosophers and legal scholars alike have spilled much ink attempting
to distill a unitary privacy interest.45 Such attempts at conceptualizing a privacy right, however, inevitably fail to capture adequately
the full range of activity people tend to think of as protected by
some sort of privacy interest.' The following Section of this Note
argues that the way one conceptualizes the right has profound implications for clickstream privacy, as the only salient conceptualizations suggest conferring upon a user the right to determine what
level of information privacy she is to enjoy. Before venturing into
this more abstract territory, however, one should understand a little more about the ways in which collecting agents acquire, use,
and sell clickstream data.

tion. Moreover, the desire not to make a decision does not automatically resolve the
question about the appropriate legal regime in favor of the status quo.
"See Lessig, supra note 9, at 143-57 (arguing that this muddled conceptualization
creates problems when new technical architectures implicate novel privacy interests).
Privacy rights may, however, be classified broadly in three ways: (1) spatial privacy
rights; (2) those rights concerned with autonomy of individual choice about significant
decisions (e.g., abortion rights); and (3) the right to control flows of personal information. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 Stan. L.
Rev. 1193, 1202-03 (1998); see also U.S. West, Inc. v. FCC, 182 F.3d 1224, 1234 (10th
Cir. 1999) (citing Fred H. Cate, Privacy in the Information Age 19-22 (1997); Joseph
I. Rosenbaum, Privacy on the Internet: Whose Information Is It Anyway?, 38 Jurimetrics J. 565, 566-67 (1998)).
41 See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 11, at 9; Julie
E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 Conn. L. Rev.
981 (1996) [hereinafter Cohen, A Right to Read].
" Alternatively, such attempts might protect too much activity.
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On the publisher's end, clickstream data may be (1) used to personalize user content, or (2) scrutinized for behavioral analysis of
customers. A cookie is just an identification number, like a bar
code, that a collecting agent writes to a user's computer. Each collecting agent sets its own cookie, so it is very difficult for any single
agent to amass comprehensive web-wide profiles of user websurfing patterns.47 If Company A recognizes a browser as cookie
#987654 and Company B recognizes that same browser as cookie
#123456, Company B cannot realize substantial gains from
purchasing Company A's clickstream data because Company B has
no way of knowing with which of its cookies it should associate
Company A cookie profile #987654. For an entity to be able to
marry two or more data sets, it needs what is called a "unique
identifier"-some coded identification that is different for each
web user and where that user has the same identification in each of
the two data sets. Unless cookie data is packaged with some unique
identifier allowing the buyer of the data to match it to its existing
data," there is no "dossier effect" whereby single collecting agents
build highly specific surfing profiles of behavior on a number of
sites. 9 Moreover, without a unique identifier associated with each
browser, robust secondary markets for non-aggregated cookie data
seem unlikely. Company A could buy clickstream data from Company B, but it would not know which of its cookies correlated with
each of Company B's.
These conditions change somewhat, however, when third parties
are the collecting agents placing cookies on browsers. A third
party, usually some sort of advertising agent,5 ' is an entity that deploys code (including a cookie) to a web page using its own ad
servers.' When a user downloads a page, the third party will either

,7"A client does not serve up cookies simply to anyone who asks. In other words,
not all servers have access to all cookies. Each cookie, when initially set, circumscribes the range of servers to whom the cookie may be subsequently given." Kang,
supra note 44, at 1227-28.
Id. at 1227-29.
49This "dossier effect" refers to the increasing comprehensiveness associated with
profiles consisting of information mined while the user is on different websites. Jenab,
supra note 22, at 646. See also Solove, supra note 3, at 1412 (noting that cookies have

certain limits with respect to their monitoring capability).
'0 See Jenab, supra note 22, at 646.
1

See id. at 645-46.
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place a new cookie on, or read its existing cookie from, the user's
browser. Third-party clickstream profiles are in some ways more
comprehensive than those of web publishers because the third parties serve material on a number of different websites 2 If Website A,
Website B, and Website C all permit (or contract for) Third Party
Z to serve the advertisements on each of their respective sites,
Third Party Z can use the same cookie for each browser irrespective of which of the three sites the user is accessing. In other words,
whereas Websites A, B, and C only know what users do while they
are on their respective sites, Third Party Z can associate the behavior of a given user on any of these sites with that user's behavior on
any of the others. Perhaps the most sophisticated of these third
parties is DoubleClick, which by 2001 was serving over five billion
targeted advertisements per week on over 11,500 websites Third
parties are therefore more responsible than are other first-party
collecting agents for the dossier phenomenon, but the scope of this
"sinister" activity is subject to the same practical limitations as is
that of first parties. Like first-party collecting agents, third parties
cannot buy or sell any clickstream data they collect unless their
data has a unique identifier that can be associated with a unique
identifier in another data set.
B. ConceptualizingPrivacyfor Clickstream Data
The first step in articulating a more analytically rigorous understanding of privacy is to distinguish between the three broad privacy concepts. First, privacy may denote the existence of a "right to
have sufficient moral freedom to exercise full individual autonomy.""' Arguments in favor of the right to reproductive freedom
fall into this category.55 Second, privacy may require some sort of
shield for activity one chooses to perform in seclusion rather than
52See

id. at 646; Solove, supra note 3, at 1412. First parties, however, are much more

likely to use personally identifiable information in cookies, so in that sense they have
more detailed profiles within a much smaller portion of the Internet space.
53See Jenab, supra note 22, at 646.
See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (noting that marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child-rearing, and education are all contexts
in which the individual has some sort of privacy protection).
55See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973) (outlining the scope of the
abortion right); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) (holding that
contraceptive prohibition unconstitutionally encumbers the right to privacy).
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in the public sphere. 6 Third, privacy may represent an individual's
claim to control "the processing-i.e., the acquisition, disclosure,
and use-of personal information., 57 The lines between these three
are often blurred, and the last two in particular seem to protect
similar interests. The frameworks discussed below, however, seek
only to analyze the third category, informational privacy.
The collection of clickstream data makes more sense conceptualized as implicating a certain type of privacy interest than it does
implicating others. This Note does not attempt to tackle the extraordinarily difficult question of which understanding of
informational privacy is "correct." Instead, this Note argues that
clickstream data collection implicates a limited set of privacy interests. These interests are most effectively captured when privacy is
understood to represent the user's right to control the conditions
under which she alienates information. This context-driven understanding of privacy is sometimes referred to as an "instrumental"
understanding because it treats privacy as a second order right, a
means to another deontic end. In other words, privacy's intrinsic
value is regarded as secondary to its role in securing other liberties.
In a recent article, Professor Daniel J.Solove wrote:
Not all privacy problems are the same, and different conceptions
of privacy work best in different contexts. Instead of trying to fit
new problems into old conceptions, we should seek to understand the special circumstances of a particular problem. What
practices are being disrupted? In what ways does the disruption
resemble or differ from other forms of disruption? How does this
disruption affect society and social structure? These are some of
the questions that should be asked when grappling with privacy
problems.58
Answering these questions for clickstream data reveals an informational privacy problem unlike any society has confronted before, and legal solutions should reflect that difference rather than
stubbornly attempt to graft old doctrines onto new circumstances.
The following discussion does not treat exhaustively all privacy
" See Kang, supra note 44, at 1202.
Id. at 1243; see supra notes 11-12.
"8Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1087, 1147 (2002).
17
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conceptualizations, but is instead limited to those bearing a substantial relationship to the clickstream privacy debate.
The first conceptualization of privacy is as a right not to reveal
information because such revelation imposes tangible burdens on
the revealer.59 Being forced to sign in at a law library is an example
of a search that imposes such burdens. In other words, the right to
privacy means the right to be free from tangible costs imposed by
collecting and searching agents." The problems with this conceptualization will not be discussed here because clickstream data collection poses no significant inconvenience for Internet users."
The second conceptualization predicates the privacy right on the
notion that monitoring and searching intrinsically offend human
dignity,62 and it therefore enjoys the moniker "dignity theory."63
Under this conceptualization, privacy violations occur even if collecting agents impose tangible costs approaching zero. More importantly, this conceptualization identifies privacy violations even
where the agent inflicting the harm may compensate the victim for
the violation. Some would invoke this conceptualization, for example, to condemn profile-driven searches at airports. ' This position
is overstated, however, because the affront to dignity associated
with such searches arises from its discriminatory application. The
proposition that universally applied, costless searches could be
what is protected by a privacy right is a problematic one. Looking
at a person may be the paradigmatic example of a costless search
" See Lessig, supra note 9, at 146 (calling this conceptualization a "utility conception" that "seeks to minimize intrusion").
'0See id.
6 Clickstream data collection imposes no tangible burdens in the sense that the
process whereby a server reads or writes a cookie does not inconvenience the user.
This lack of tangible burdens should be distinguished from subsequent burdens imposed on the user because some third party imposes them as a result of obtaining access to the data point.
62See Lessig, supra note 9, at 147-48. People tend to frame these claims extravagantly, and it is often unclear exactly what they mean when they say that privacy offends dignity. See Volokh, supra note 12, at 1110-11.
63 See, e.g., Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting
International Data Privacy
Rules in Cyberspace, 52 Stan. L. Rev. 1315, 1341 (2000).
' This example is imperfect because such searches certainly impose tangible costs
on those who are searched. This condition, however, is unimportant to the subsequent
point about discriminatory application. The point is merely that the tangible cost is
usually very low, involving only a quick trip over to a security guard who brushes for
explosives.
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but, in most circumstances, privacy does not restrict the entitle-

ment to see someone on the street. One may insult another by staring too long, but the glance is offensive because it is cast selectively.
Ignoring further the dignity theory's obvious circularity problem,65
the tangible costs imposed on web surfers through collecting clickstream data are close to zero,66 and when most collecting agents
"collect," they do so neither to identify nor to discriminate by race,
national origin, sexual orientation, or by any other culturally sensitive variable.67
The third conceptualization of the right is the reciprocal of Victorian propriety. Under this theory, privacy protects the right to be
naughty,6" and privacy's role in defining the physical boundaries for
adherence to propriety prompts many to term this paradigm "civility theory."69 Civility theory comes in two substrains. First, privacy
may represent a shield against punishment of illegal acts, so long as
they are performed outside the public sphere. The most troublesome issue for this substrain is deciding who determines which
crimes the law should punish. Some may believe victimless deviance to be protected, but nobody believes murder, if only committed behind closed doors, is protected by a privacy interest. Moreover, if privacy protects the freedom to do otherwise-illegal acts at
home, law could achieve these results much less ambiguously by
building those contingencies into positive legislative enactments.7
Although more clickstream privacy would increase protection for
illegal activity,72 this protection is not what animates clickstream
65The idea that privacy protects a sense of dignity that may only be defined in reference to what is properly private.
66See supra note 61.
67See, e.g., DoubleClick Privacy Policy, supra note 42 ("DoubleClick does not de-

velop marketing scores that indicate a user's individual health condition, detailed financial information, sexual orientation or behavior, information that appears to relate
to children under 13, racial and ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical opinions, and trade union membership."). DoubleClick is considered the collecting agent with the most comprehensive profiles.
68See Lessig, supra note 9, at 148.
69See, e.g., Reidenberg, supra note 63,
at 1341.
0See Lessig, supra note 9, at 148.
Id. (noting that other laws and amendments could restrict the scope of searches).
7 See Richard Posner, The Right to Privacy, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 393, 397-401 (1978);
see, e.g., Richard Posner, Overcoming Law 546-51 (1995) (discussing how increased
privacy might enable blackmail).
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privacy enthusiasts.73 The illegal activities that this substrain seeks
to protect tend to involve deviant sex acts, such as oral or anal
penetration, that are physically impossible in light of the nature of
the online medium.4
The deficiencies in the first substrain are not present in the second. According to this second theory, the right of privacy protects
behavior that, while not illegal, is socially unpopular. Under a regime with strong privacy protection, those engaging in legal but socially deviant behavior may do so without fearing public exposure.
This vision of privacy protects two types of values. First, there is intrinsic value in not forcing people to suppress their thoughts and
feelings. People are allowed to "be themselves" behind closed
doors, and in so doing are allowed to perform activities to which
they are legally entitled, but from which they may refrain if forced
to perform them publicly. 75 Second, it assures the socially advantageous survival of legal, but deviant, lifestyles and viewpoints. For
example, if privacy enables anonymous speech, this anonymity allows people to advance unpopular political viewpoints without
fearing the consequences of unpopularity. 76 Although privacy conceived of as protection against majoritarian social norms could explain the push for more anonymity in many web transactions, it
does not bear strongly on the clickstream data controversy. This is
because clickstream data transactions generally do not generate a
personally identifiable chronique scandaleuse sufficient to chill deviant activity. Some scholars would counter that disclosure is not a
necessary condition for chilling, as the mere act of surveillance is
enough to cause people to modify their behavior. This assertion is
plainly true, and one may say no more than that the magnitude of
the modifications is proportionately related to the likelihood of
disclosure. With respect to clickstream data, however, in almost no
circumstance will the link between a name and deviant activity be

" Enthusiasts would hardly benefit from a perception that they wanted to protect
criminals.
" For a discussion of rape in cyberspace, see Julian Dibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace,
Village Voice, Dec. 21,1993, at 36, reprintedin 1994 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 471 (1994).
7"See Kang, supra note 44, at 1260 (noting that surveillance creates a threat of self-

censorship); Hunter, supra note 22.
76

See Belgum, supra note 8,

34.
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disclosed to a third party unless that activity is both deviant and illegal.
Professor Julie Cohen is among the most persuasive exponents
of the fourth conceptualization, which treats privacy as "constitutive" in the sense that it is an essential condition for one to function
meaningfully in a democratic society." Commentators generally refer to this position as "autonomy theory"78 because it characterizes
privacy as flowing directly from the notion that it is a necessary
condition for individual autonomy. 9 While the quality of these arguments should not be understated, these arguments do not figure
prominently in this discussion for at least two reasons. First,
Cohen's position occupies highly contentious philosophical space.
Powerful counterarguments cohabit this intellectual territory, and
resolving the broader issues regarding the role of self-definition in
political institutions lies beyond the scope of this Note.' Second,
any attempt to apply this conceptualization of privacy to the clickstream context is almost impossible. Cohen's argument is so abstract that even if one accepted its philosophical propositions onface, the application would remain subject to intense debate.8'
Finally, some, including commentator Professor Jeffrey Rosen,
conceive of informational privacy as a right to control how one is
revealed to others.' To adopt the nomenclature favored by privacy
71See

Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously, supra note 45, at 1003-19; Julie E.
Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 Stan. L.
Rev. 1373, 1423-36 (2000) [hereinafter Cohen, Examined Lives] (arguing that there
should be a constitutionally-created right against certain kinds of commercial collection); Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology, supra note 20, at 2039 ("Modern
privacy advocates, including both [Jeffrey] Rosen and myself, conceive of privacy as a
species of constitutive freedom and view that freedom as both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable."); see also Schwartz, supra note 3, at 834-43 (discussing various aspects and implications of constitutive privacy).
78See Reidenberg, supra note 63, at 1341.
" See Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 77, at 1423-36.
80See, e.g., David Brin, The Transparent Society: Will Technology Force Us to
Choose Between Privacy and Freedom? 23 (1998) (arguing that more, not less, access
to certain personal information would solve many privacy problems); Rosen, supra
note 11, at 209 ("Not everyone is convinced by the social value of privacy.").
"1For example, if one decided that there was a constitutive right to read anonymously, would web surfing count as reading? If web surfing were considered reading,
how anonymous would the cookies have to be? Would such a paradigm allow pseudonymonous profiling?
" See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 11, at 10.
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theorists, this idea fits under the umbrella of autonomy theory.83
Distinctions between Rosen's theory and those of other autonomy
theorists center in part on the acceptable conditions for alienating
information.
In The Unwanted Gaze, Rosen uses the Monica Lewinsky debacle to illustrate this conceptualization." During the course of the
Paula Jones trial the court subpoenaed Lewinsky's purchase history from Amazon.com. Some of the purchases were embarrassing
to Lewinsky, and Rosen argues that this violated privacy conceptualized as the right to selective revelation.85 The government violated Lewinsky's rights because it impaired her ability to reveal
herself selectively to others-she became "that type of person"
who reads books about phone sex.86 Lewinsky therefore became a
personality subject to cultural stereotypes and uninformed generalizations." Lewinsky ultimately elected to cede her purchase records to the Starr commission without a legal contest, so the issue
of whether certain courts may subpoena this information remains
unanswered.'
One can envision both a weak and a strong statement of this
conceptualization. The weak version would say that people have
the right to selectively reveal personal information to collecting
agents. There are obvious exceptions-people must submit financial information to the IRS, for example-but most would not object to the gist of this assertion. The weak version, then, is more an
obvious statement of moral consensus than anything else. Absent
extenuating circumstances, people are free not to disclose personal
information to collecting agents.
The strong version of the conceptualization, however, does resonate in the clickstream context.89 This version suggests not only that
See Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology, supra note 20, at 2030-31.
Rosen, supra note 11, at 4-6.
See id. at 229-30.

See Daniel M. Filler, From Law to Content in the New Media Marketplace, 90
Cal. L. Rev. 1739, 1751-52 (2002) (book review) (discussing the type of person that
reads a book about phone sex).
8'See Rosen, supra note 11, at 9.
' See David Streitfeld, Lewinsky to Turn Over Book Purchase Information, Wash.
Post, June 23, 1998, at A4.
" See Rosen, supra note 11, at 198 ("[Pleople don't want their browsing habits collected in personally identifiable dossiers, because those dossiers can be bought or
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people may selectively reveal themselves to collecting agents, but
that they may also control how those entities use the information
and to whom they reveal it. Because Rosen's idea regarding the
right to control and condition the revelation of personal information to other entities-to be judged in context-may be a bit ambiguous, the concept requires some elaboration. First, the fight to
be judged in context may mean the right to be judged only when
the person doing the judging has all relevant information before
making a judgment. Such a position is a conceptual impossibility,
however, as every judgment one makes about another is based on
an incomplete collection of information about that person.' Second, it may mean a right to be judged only when there is sufficient
information to make an informed judgment. This threshold of sufficiency, however, is almost impossible to identify-how much information would be enough, and in which contexts? Third, and
most plausibly, it may mean the right to have collecting agents
abide by conditions of information transfer so as to give those
about whom they are collecting information substantial control
over data used to make probabilistic judgments in secondary contexts. A "secondary context" is some exchange of information involving the collecting agent after the subject of that information
has transmitted it to that collecting agent. The following discussion
proceeds from this third understanding.
The corollary of the notion that users may refuse to reveal information in the presence of certain conditions is the notion that
they may disclose information. What most find objectionable in the
clickstream context is the inability of users to condition revelation
on a collecting agent's adherence to a set of mutually understood
expectations. An Internet user will reveal information when the return on revealing it exceeds the cost. The "cost" of revealing information and, to a lesser extent, the return on revelation are
highly subjective values, particularly in the clickstream context.

subpoenaed by employers, insurance companies, divorcing spouses, and others who
have the ability to affect our lives in profound ways.").
9 Such a claim is obviously predicated on the idea that any collection of information
is an imperfect proxy for reality. See Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 77, at 1404
("Information theory, in contrast, recognizes that 'information' and 'reality' are different (though related) things, and that 'knowledge' forms an imperfect and culturally
contingent bridge between them.").
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The following Sections argue that these subjective valuations are
difficult to reconcile with any prophylactic standard and that legal
rules should complement market exchanges for this information.
III.

INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY AND FAILING MARKETS

A. Defining the Market
Because many accept the proposition that a state of informational privacy is a by-product of the market for information," a
large subset of those who find that state undesirable may characterize that condition as one of "market failure."92 Before devising
legal regimes to correct market failures, however, one must understand the character of the failure itself.93
The first step in addressing market failure is identifying who is
failing to buy or sell what at a competitive price from or to whom.
The proposition that "the information market is failing" contemplates the market at an inappropriately high level of abstraction.
The proposition that the "market for online information is failing"
is similarly suspect (in that it is too abstract) for at least two reasons. First, collecting and searching agents obtain data in a variety
of ways, and only a fraction of those exhibit properties whereby society can comfortably deploy market institutions to control the
transfer of information. Second, even if one can characterize a
standard practice as a market, it does not follow that all such practices that take place in the same medium (cyberspace) comprise
the same market. Markets for email lists are quite distinct from
markets for clickstream data. There is some overlap between the
two because the same collecting and searching agents may be involved, but the transactional requirements governing information
exchange in each context are radically different. Properly concep91

See, e.g., Cohen, Privacy, Ideology and Technology, supra note 20, at 2031

("Within the private sector, the impetus for the destruction of privacy is not prurience
or prudishness, but core values that animate the rational marketplace behavior of
profit-seeking entities.").
92See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 3, at 833 ("Due to the pervasive failure in the privacy market in the United States, a subsidy is given to those data processing companies that exploit personal data.").
" See generally Charles Wolf, Jr., A Theory of Nonmarket Failure: Framework for
Implementation Analysis, 22 J.L. & Econ. 107, 107-12 (1979) (discussing nonmarket
failure and the four classic types of market failures).
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tualized, the underlying exchange does not involve currency, but
instead represents a sale of data where the marginal loss of informational privacy" associated with downloading a web page approaches the value a user gains by viewing it.95
The market for personal information collected during the course
of online transactions, such as registrations or purchases, and the
market for clickstream data may be failing for reasons that are, in
the abstract, similar. Each market exhibits chronic information
asymmetries, and, in each market, information-buyers exhibit suspect fidelity to expressed obligations.96 The costs and returns on
collecting data in each market, however, are radically different.
Each market therefore requires a unique set of rules to correct its
particular failures. The following is a discussion of the clickstream
market.
B. Identifying Failure
The second step in addressing a market failure is determining
which conditions constitute failure and whether the market in
question exhibits them. In his illuminating 1979 article on nonmarket failures, economist Charles Wolf, Jr. begins by summarizing
"the essential points in the accepted theory" of market failures.'
The four archetypal market failures occur in situations where there
exist (1) externalities and public goods; "8 (2) increasing returns;" (3)

9 In actuality, the marginal value could be equal to or exceed the value of the marginal privacy loss and whatever other marginal costs (e.g., time) are associated with
the page view. I treat these values other than privacy loss as negligible.
" The notion that there may be a cognizable market for information is easier to accept once one understands that the act of viewing a web page is a transactional exchange. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
96See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 822-23.
9 See Wolf, supra note 93, at 107-08. Wolf notes that the appropriate concept is actually closer to "market inadequacies" than to "market failures," since, strictly speaking, "market failures" refers exclusively to departures from Pareto-efficient outcomes
and therefore ignores the distributional implications of different strategies. Id. at 108
n.5.
98Id. at 108.
99
Id. at 109.
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market imperfections relating to information asymmetries and
transaction costs; ° and (4) distributional inequities."'
Although there may be salient points to be made about the presence of (1) and (2) in the clickstream market,10 2 most of the literature addresses (3) and (4).1113 Those failures associated with market
imperfections are discussed extensively below, but conspicuously
omitted is a similarly comprehensive discussion relating to the distributional implications of clickstream privacy. Many commentators lament the fact that consumers may be compelled to forgo
their privacy because they cannot get the relevant goods or services
elsewhere."' Because these choices can be made in a perfectly functioning market, however, the objection relating to the distribution
of information value between collecting agents and users is one
rooted in philosophy, not in economics. Moreover, such concerns
are less pressing in the clickstream context because the good in
question is often highly fungible reading material. To the extent
that there will often exist many close substitutes for a given piece
of nonessential material, a choice, made in a perfectly functioning
market, to cede certain pieces of user information would not constitute a forced sale in the sense that the user sells because there
are no substitute buyers. 5 If a user were unwilling to cede information under certain conditions, she would have the option of going
to another website. The market for clickstream data therefore fails
t(EId. at 110. Wolf does not actually identify "transaction costs," but such costs certainly fit under the umbrella of imperfect mobility characteristics of perfect markets.
See id.
"' Id. at 110-12.
'0'For example, transactions for personal data contain inevitable externalities. See
Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense
of Privacy, 84 Geo. L.J. 2381, 2401-02 (1996). With respect to the increasing returns
scenario, there may well be certain instances where the marginal cost of collecting
each data point is constant, but to the extent that this concern relates to how this constant figure manifests itself in monopoly markets, it is less salient in the clickstream
context because of the absence of such monopolies.
103 See, e.g., Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 77, at 1397-98 (arguing
that inadequate discounting distorts consumer privacy valuations); Solove, supra note 3, at
1450-51 (identifying several problems with the information market); Jeff Sovern, Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1305,
1327-28 (2001) (addressing the character of information asymmetries).
: See, e.g., Cohen, Examined Lives, supra note 77, at 1397.
'For an example demonstrating that these conditions exist, see id. at 1397; infra
Section VI.B.
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primarily in the third sense, because there exist tremendous market
imperfections relating to insufficient information and enforcement.
Those problems are treated more comprehensively in Section C
below.
Commentators almost pathologically appropriate survey results
as evidence of widespread market failure." 6 These surveys, however, are rarely useful in helping lawmakers understand such failure. They provide little guidance for at least four reasons: (1) the
wording of questions distorts results; 7 (2) attitudes about "privacy" reflect attitudes about activity that is conceptually distinct
from that term's meaning;" (3) the surveys do not accurately represent tradeoffs between privacy and other consumer preferences;' 9 and (4) they generally do not measure the concern for
online privacy relative to other social desires."0 Problems (1), (2),
and (4) are all salient reasons for rejecting survey data as a cornerstone of online privacy discussion, but problem (3) is particularly
compelling. To illustrate this point, assume a market comprised of
only two cars, Mercedes and Subaru. If ninety-nine percent of survey respondents indicate a "strong preference" for Mercedes over
Subaru, this fact does not mean that the market is in disequilibrium
because only three percent of the population actually owns the
German automobile. Naturally, most people prefer a state of privacy over one of no privacy, but such a statement says nothing
about the strength of that preference. Surveys therefore distort the
choice because in reality the decision is not between a state of privacy and that of no privacy, but between a state of more privacy
'06 See, e.g., Hatch, supra note 7, at 1477-81 (reciting a number of survey results);
see Bartow, supra note 8, at 675 (citing Steve Lohr, Compressed Data: Survey Shows
Few Trust Promises on Online Privacy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 17, 2000, at C4 (quoting a
market research firm study that found that ninety-two percent of people don't trust
companies to keep information confidential)); Jenab, supra note 22, at 651-52 (citing
various poll results to suggest that Americans are concerned about privacy and that
more legislation is necessary to protect it); Jim Harper & Solveig Singleton, With a
Grain of Salt: What Consumer Privacy Surveys Don't Tell Us (June 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association), available at Social Science Research Network, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid
=299930.
"7Harper & Singleton, supra note 106, at 1.
108Id.
1
09Id.
10 Id. at 2.
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and other goods. Despite the ostensibly intense preference for privacy expressed in surveys, most consumers do not turn off their
cookies."' In fact, one online study showed that less than one percent of users had their cookies disabled.1 2 Why this tremendous
disjunct between what consumers say and what they do? There are
two reasons. First, as discussed above, consumers' actual privacy
13
preferences are not nearly as strong as survey figures suggest.
Second, as will be discussed below, the current market systematically disadvantages consumers.
C. Causes of Market Failure
The third step in addressing market failure involves understanding why users are systematically failing to exact a competitive price
from collecting agents. These failures are well chronicled in the legal literature," 4 but in the interest of simplicity they can be grouped
into two broad categories. First, when consumers implicitly "consent" to observation by viewing a page, they generally do not know
what collecting agents may do with that observation (if the consumers know that they are being observed at all)."' Second, no effective enforcement mechanism guarantees compliance with the
expectations generated if a user conditions her consent upon promises made by the collecting agent."6 The two are closely relatedone cannot enforce the conditions upon which a user grants consent without first discerning that a user has "consented"-but in
order to understand how they relate, it is first necessary to discuss
the two separately.
The first cause of clickstream market failure is an egregious information asymmetry between users and collecting agents because
consumers lack information about what collecting agents may do
..Id. at 7.
"2Id. (citing Privacy: Caught With the Cookie Jar, Nat'l J. Tech. Daily, A.M. Edition, Apr. 4, 2001, at http://nationaljournal.com/pubs/techdaily/ ("Web analysis service Web Side Story found in a review of more than 1 billion page views cookies were
disabled just .68 percent of the time.")).
:,See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
"" See Wolf, supra note 93, at 107.
IS See Solove, supra note 3, at 1451; Hunter, supra note 22.
116See Solove, supra note 3, at 1451-52; Robert Thibadeau, A Critique of P3P: Privacy on the Web, at http://dollar.ecom.cmu.edu/p3pcritique/ (Aug. 23, 2000) (on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association).
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with their data."7 It almost goes without saying that, as opposed to
users, the collecting agents themselves know which data they are
collecting and with some exceptions, what they will do with it."8 In
the absence of legal enforcement, the market could nonetheless
function efficiently if consumers could roughly calibrate their surfing patterns to reflect the amount of information they wished to divulge."9 In such a model, a user would effectively "vote with her
mouse," visiting only those pages for which the value of the "view"
exceeded the marginal loss associated with revealing the data point
(and other costs associated with looking at the page).'20
Consumers must acquire knowledge about what collecting
agents do with data, but the problem is that they struggle to do so
when the agent does not conveniently provide such knowledge.
The relational information defaults of the consumer-collecting
agent transaction (in the clickstream context) give buyers no incentive to inform the sellers. The absence of meaningful consumer
awareness, coupled with the even-more-conspicuous absence of legal rules for enforcing the promises contained in online privacy
policies, means that the collecting agent has little incentive to facilitate an explicit understanding of user expectations.
Many collecting agents now have hyperlinks to privacy policies
housed on a company website.'2' Anyone who has tried to read
them, however, knows that discerning their clear meaning is an exercise in frustration. The policies are often difficult to locate.'22 The
language of the policies is often unclear and difficult for laypeople
17 See Solove, supra note 3, at 1431; Hunter, supra note 22.
"'Collecting agents can never anticipate all the ways they may be able to use data.

New uses of data spring up all the time, and part of the value collecting agents attribute to a certain datum is surely some residual possibility of an unexpected use.
"' This is simply the standard economic argument that, ceteris paribus, consumers
would gravitate toward those services that exacted privacy of some value less than
that acquired through the page view.
120See supra note 94.
121 See,
e.g., Walt Disney Internet Group (WDIG) Privacy Policy, at http://
disney.go.com/legal/privacy-policy.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2003) (containing the
privacy policy for, among other websites, ESPN.com); see also Schwartz, supra note 3,
at 823-24 (noting that the Georgetown Internet Privacy Policy Survey, sponsored by
the Federal Trade Commission, "found that Web sites with the most passenger traffic
were increasingly offering click-on 'Privacy Notices').
22These policies are increasingly used and available, but they are rarely featured
prominently on the homepage.
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to understand.13 Although it is rarely clear to the user what activity
constitutes consent to which terms, "sticking around" is increasingly treated as granting consent to use data collected as users
navigate the website. 2 4 Websites often reserve the right to change
their privacy policy at any time.' Finally, the policies rarely clarify
the information
practices of third parties with material on the web21 6
site.

Some commentators resist legal solutions to this conundrum because they maintain that, given time, industry norms will adjust to
rectify the situation.'27 They point to industry initiatives to control
data mining and the advent of certificatory companies like
TRUSTe as evidence of the success of these developing norms.'28
These responses, however, have quite noticeably failed to force
collecting agents to reveal a substantial amount of information.'29
Generally speaking, these certificatory companies merely verify
the existence of privacy policies rather than examine their accuracy.'30 Even if these certificatory companies succeed in compelling
collecting agents to post privacy policies, such success would not
'23
See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 824.
See id. (noting that the rule of thumb seems to be that if an Internet user sticks

124

around, then that person has effectively consented to all terms, even if those terms
change over time).
25See, e.g., The Kroger Co. Privacy Policy, Kroger, at http://kroger.com/privacypolicy.htm (last visited May 28, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) ("We reserve the right to change our privacy policy at any time.").
126 See Hunter, supra note 22.
127 See, e.g., Electronic Commerce: The Current Status of Privacy Protections for
Online Consumers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the House Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 89-94 (1999) (statement
of Solveig Singleton, Director of Information Studies, The CATO Institute), available
at www.cato.org/testimony/ct-ss071399.html.
21 See Froomkin, supra note 9, at 1525 (stating that TRUSTe.com
may be "the most
visible and successful self-regulatory initiative"). Companies like TRUSTe provide
seals authenticating the integrity of a site's professed data practices. Id.
129See Heimes, supra note 39, at 97; Jenab, supra note 22, at 660 ("Market participants are not, then, rushing to enact meaningful privacy policies."). Jenab further
cites a study indicating "that fewer than 10% of the web's busiest sites adequately inform consumers of how their personal information is being processed," while 92.9%
of them collect personal data. Id. (citing Comments on the Georgetown Internet Privacy Policy Survey, Center for Democracy and Technology, at http://www.msb.
edu/faculty/culnanm/GIPPS/cdt.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2001)).
'" See Froomkin, supra note 9, at 1525 (discussing the procedures of the TRUSTe
certificatory company).
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address problems involving what constitutes consent to such policies. Finally, collecting agents are not consistently re-evaluated to
ensure that they are complying with the policy as originally conveyed to the certificatory company."' These certificatory companies possess an economic incentive not to be too harsh on clients. 2
Substantial evidence shows that these privacy policies do not figure
prominently in users' decisions to allow collecting agents to exact
information.'33 Consequently, the risk of net losses associated with
aggressive enforcement through suspension of trustmarks (icons
indicating that a given collecting agent meets certain standards)
would render these programs sufficiently unappealing to potential
clients that these certificatory companies would be enforcing themselves right out of the market.'34
Although the relevant literature extensively discusses the failure
of legal rules to force collecting agents to disclose information regarding data practices,'35 it largely ignores their failure to force consumers to reveal certain useful pieces of information about themselves: their privacy preferences. The effect is to promote a regime
where buyers have to reveal what they do without sellers having to
reveal what they want. Such an oversight is understandable because, up until quite recently,3" there had been no cost-efficient
way for users to transmit this information to collecting agents.
Even if websites had been willing to provide a form to determine
the clickstream privacy preferences of their users, the number of
people completing the form would have been so small that the economic benefit to a website differentiating its service offering based
on those preferences would be minimal.'37 A drop in the costs of
revealing preferences would increase gains from trade by giving

2

See, e.g., id. at 1526.
Id. at 1526-27.

See Cranor et al., supra note 28.
See Froomkin, supra note 9, at 1526-27.
135See supra notes 118-34 and accompanying text.
13
'

'

See infra Section V.B.
of the form would surely be voluntary, and the return on time spent

137Completion

filling out the form would in almost every instance fail to give sufficient incentives for
the user to fill it out.
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collecting agents valuable information about the potential consumer
response to changes in privacy policies."'
The second broad cause of clickstream market failure is the glaring absence of a meaningful legal enforcement mechanism. Even if
a website's privacy policy is abundantly clear, no legal force guarantees the expectations it generates. 3 9 Granting a civil cause of action to the person whose expectations are disappointed does not
make sense if the cost of bringing it exceeds the value lost by the
collecting agent's violation.
The absence of any enforcement mechanism means that sites do
not have to honor their own privacy policies and that they are free
to use whatever language they choose in crafting potentially misleading guarantees. Collecting agents have an incentive to avoid
misusing consumer information only to the extent that such use
risks negative publicity. The violation of consumer expectations
must be enormous before it inflicts sufficiently concentrated losses
to generate a response. DoubleClick's acquisition of Abacas Direct, an offline data miner, was one such public incident.' ° Collecting agents are free to commit smaller violations because in such
' In a market with accurate information about data uses, a collecting agent would
stand to gain from knowledge of the privacy preferences of its audience/user base.
Based on that information, the agent may be able to diversify its services so as to satisfy each user's privacy preference. At very high costs of acquiring information about
these preferences, however, the return on understanding the privacy preferences of its
audience/user base is not worth the costs of figuring them out.
..See Froomkin, supra note 9, at 1527 (stating that the United States might be
unique in having a self-regulatory system without any means of enforcing it); James
Goodale et al., Panel I: The Conflict Between Commercial Speech and Legislation
Governing the Commercialization of Public Sector Data, 11 Fordham Intell. Prop.
Media & Ent. L.J. 21, 22-23 (2000) (identifying the need for enforcement as a critical
issue in online privacy discourse); Solove, supra note 3, at 1451 ("Most privacy policies have no way to prevent changes in policy or a binding enforcement mechanism."); Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 Wash. L. Rev. 1033, 1100 (1999) ("[S]ome
enforcement apparatus would be necessary to ensure that businesses were living up to
their obligations under the regulation."); Belgum, supra note 8, $ 46; Thibadeau, supra note 116.
'40 See Rosen, supra note 11, at 164. DoubleClick, the largest advertising network on
the Internet, purchased Abacus Direct, which possessed an enormous marketing database profiling offline consumer behavior. DoubleClick declared its intention to
cross-reference its online data with that of the offline marketer, igniting a firestorm
ultimately causing its stock to plummet and prompting it to alter its plans for the data
integration. See id.; see also Zimmerman, supra note 40, at 445 (describing DoubleClick's acquisition and the subsequent public reaction).
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situations they do not incur the losses associated with public relations disasters. One should not overstate the latitude collecting
agents currently enjoy, however, because these disasters carry a
sufficiently severe penalty that data miners already have an incentive to avoid the most egregious practices implicating informational
privacy.
The failure of consumers to track and report back on misuse of
their clickstream data represents the classic collective-action problem.'4 ' A single consumer cannot appropriate all the information
gains a market would accrue through such unilateral audits. Only
for the most extreme privacy sociopath is the return on monitoring
sufficiently large that it exceeds its cost, so only such user anomalies would bother to see what happens to their data. In the absence
of a legal entitlement to preclude misuse, news about a violation
does nothing but provide consumers with information about the
likelihood of such an occurrence in the future. Without a cause of
action, the user performing such meticulous tracking gets only this
predictive information in return for her exhausting audit.
Norms also fail to remedy this aspect of market failure. If users
could successfully organize to fund a single auditing agent, then information about misuse, even absent a cause of action, could be
worth the pro-rata cost of contribution. Certificatory companies
such as TRUSTe, however, do not do any such back-end inquiries
into whether collecting agents adhere to the obligations expressed
in their privacy policies.' 2 The absence of such unitary auditing entities is likely a testament to the fact that, without a cause of action,
consumers are not willing to pay for them.
The absence of any back-end check on whether collecting agents
are fulfilling their obligations has disastrous effects on the market.
Unenforceability renders the cost of exchanging information extremely uncertain for consumers. As adherence to expressed obligations becomes more uncertain, and because users are risk-averse,
the valuation a user places on a privacy term, VUser falls to a level

lower than the expected likelihood of adherence multiplied by Vuser
where all obligations are honored. This uncertainty destroys poten1' See

Schwartz, supra note 3, at 822. For a textbook explanation of the collective-

action problem, see Charles J. Goetz, Cases and Materials on Law and Economics 2429 1984).
' See Froomkin, supra note 9, at 1525.
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tial gains from trade with risk-averse users who are aware that they
are being observed. Some would doubtlessly respond to this claim
by noting that the explosion of Internet surfing over the last several
years belies uncertainty's value-destroying effects,'43 but such uncertainty is only one of many variables that govern the decision
about whether to surf the Internet. The argument is not that uncertainty grinds web surfing to a halt, but instead that, ceteris paribus,
it retards growth relative to a market without it.
D. Two Objectives for a Solution
The final step in addressing market failure involves identifying
the objectives that should drive measures to fix it. If one accepts
that under appropriate conditions certain information should be
freely alienable, then it is relatively uncontroversial that some mix
of the following two objectives should animate the market for
clickstream data: (1) Consumer expectations should be protected
(the "compensatory objective") and (2) information should flow to
the highest valued use (the "utility objective"). Unfortunately,
these objectives are not always complementary. The relationship
between these objectives may be illustrated by a mathematical relationship. If costs of information, transaction, and enforcement
were all zero and VUser" was known by all parties, then any promotion of the compensatory objective would always promote the utility objective so long as the user received VUse, upon any single unauthorized use of the data, DU,,,,,h, where the value of such use,
DUVati , exceeds Vu,, Then, by definition, collecting agents
would always and only violate expectations when the value of the
unauthorized use exceeded the user's reservation price for parting
with her privacy.'45 If collecting agents always and only violate consumer expectations when DUV u,,,, > VUS,, and if the aforementioned assumptions hold, a legal regime facilitating such decisionmaking would satisfy both objectives.
"'See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 12, at 1118 (arguing that the absence of such enforcement mechanisms demonstrates that uncertainty about privacy does not chill
Internet use).
'" Again, Vu, is the value the user places on adherence to the privacy term-not the
value the user places on the page view itself.
145This conclusion is true assuming a user's reservation price is generally equivalent
to V,_, (an assumption relaxed in subsequent analysis).
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The fact that none of these assumptions holds in the real world
means that, at some level of fidelity to privacy expectations, increased enforcement will diminish gains from trade. In a situation
where there existed no fidelity to privacy expectations, increased
enforcement would almost certainly bolster gains from trade by
keeping the Internet attractive to consumers.'4 6 A state of informational privacy where collecting agents exhibited no fidelity to user
expectations would generate uncertainty that would almost certainly deter web surfing, making it more difficult for collecting
agents to acquire data in the first place. At some higher level of enforcement, however, the associated costs may begin to constrain
gains from trade as they would either decrease the net benefit of
data collection for collecting agents or decrease the reservation
price paid to the user in the event of a violation.'47
Nevertheless, holding the level of privacy protection constant,
one legal regime is preferable to another if it can be implemented
with fewer sacrifices in the form of gains from trade in information.
Ideally, a legal regime would seek to encourage unauthorized data
uses so long as (1) the collecting agent pays the user at least VUser
(satisfying the compensatory objective), and (2) DUV,,, > VUser
(satisfying the utility objective). Economists would consider these
secondary data uses to be "Pareto superior" because all parties
would be at least as well off as they would be prior to the violation
of the privacy term. '
The practical workability of a legal regime grounded in such
thinking turns on the availability of its technological predicates. It
would seem obtuse to speak of a user's reservation price if there
"This would happen because the increased certainty would come without any implementation or enforcement costs. For a general discussion of the ways in which fair
information practices relate to network use, see Joel R. Reidenberg & Francoise Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental Role of Privacy and Confidence in the Network, 30 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 105, 123-25 (1995). This analysis assumes people know that collecting
agents were acquiring information on them.
"' In other words, because implementation and enforcement do cost something, at
some point the marginal expenditure on enforcement will not be worth the marginal
increase in those willing to use the Internet. This happens because either the user or
the collecting agent will bear much of the implementation and enforcement cost, effectively diminishing the return on transactions for information.
'The user is better off because she gets paid an amount equivalent to her valuation
on the privacy expectation, Vu-,, and the collecting agent is better off because it gets
value equivalent to DUVu,,, - V,er.
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were no realistic way of determining it. It would be similarly
wrongheaded to premise rules on the ability to return these values
to consumers in the event that collecting agents violate expectations if there is no realistic way either of identifying the violation or
of inexpensively compensating the "victim."
Parts V and VI advance some ideas about how a regime might
solve these problems, but there admittedly remains a salient objection regarding the difficulty of enforcing expectations at a sufficiently low transaction cost so as to preserve gains from trade. Following Part IV's discussion of current privacy doctrine is an
attempt to outline a statutory regime that achieves both compensatory and utility objectives by minimizing the transaction cost of
monitoring and punishing clickstream privacy violations.
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF LEGAL PROTECTION

Existing legal doctrine is not equipped to deal with the novel
demand for information that the World Wide Web enables. 49
Statutory remedies, on at least three occasions, have proven to be
equally incapable of redressing alleged injury from abuse of cookie
data.5 There exists no comprehensive U.S. privacy legislation, and
courts have, for various reasons, refused to subject clickstream proSee Lessig, supra note 9, at 152-53 (arguing that the advanced modern capacity to
monitor and archive data exacerbates privacy concerns); Murphy, supra note 102, at
2402 ("The plummeting cost of data storage and dissemination and the expanding
uses of particularized information have conspired to drive up the value of such information to third parties, and, hence, to the merchant who collects the information.").
10 See Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (dismissing
claims against a third-party ad server arising under the Stored Communications Act
and the Federal Wiretap Act); In re DoubleClick, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (dismissing claims against a third-party ad network arising under the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, the Federal Wiretap Act, and the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act); In re Intuit, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (dismissing claims
against a first-party website operator arising under the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act and the Federal Wiretap Act). The reasoning for the dismissals varies from case
to case. Even in the event that courts were to apply a statutory prohibition to cookieassignment, such a prohibition would doubtlessly be prophylactic in character and
therefore subject to many of the same criticisms leveled in notes 177-83 infra and accompanying text. There has been one case that has held cookie collection to be in violation of the Electronics Communications Privacy Act, but in that case, the violation
stemmed from the fact that the third party collecting personally identifiable information on users did not secure adequate consent from its first-party website business
partners to do so. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 439 F.3d 9, 20 (1st Cir. 2003).
149
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tocols to the Stored Communications Act,"' the Federal Wiretap
Act, 52 and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. 53' Fourth Amend-

ment law and privacy torts are the primary nonstatutory vessels
available to those who would invoke the law to control entities that
buy and sell clickstream data. Unfortunately, applying privacy tort
law would require courts to completely rework existing doctrine,

and applying the Fourth Amendment would require the same to be
done to the Constitution154

Under the state action doctrine, the Constitution grants individuals protection against only state actors. 55 Most of the entities
that systematically collect and distribute information about Internet users, however, are private.5 6 Constitutional protection surrounding the exchange of personal information is therefore limited. 7

Most of what people find objectionable in the clickstream context has little or nothing to do with government. Private companies
collect cookie data and other private companies buy it. In 1890,
Professor Samuel Warren and then-Professor Louis Brandeis first
advanced the modern conception of privacy in their famous article

"',Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2710 (2000); see supra note 150.
The scope of statutory regulations is quite small. The most substantial privacy law is
the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2710. The online scope of the act
is limited to civil and criminal interception, use, and disclosure rules for email content.
See David L. Sobel, The Process that "John Doe" is Due: Addressing the Legal Challenge to Internet Anonymity, 5 Va. J.L. & Tech. 3, J$ 9-10 (2000), at
http://www.vjolt.net/vol5/symposium/v5ila3-Sobel.html (on file with the Virginia Law
Review Association).
1i2 Federal Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000); see supra note 150.
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2000); see supra note 150.
The Supreme Court's holding in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), suggests that
some constitutional protection for informational privacy may exist where the state is
the collecting agent. See id. at 606 (Brennan, J. concurring).
' See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Spetalieri v. Kavanaugh, 36 F. Supp. 2d 92,107 (N.D.N.Y 1998).
"6 See supra note 5.
117 Professor Lawrence Lessig has argued that, because
the government can control
the development of Internet architecture, the state action doctrine is not as inapposite
in the online context as one might think. See Lessig, supra note 9, at 217. This position
seems to ignore the fact that the government can almost always control the terms by
which private parties exchange information, but such control does not render the underlying private activity subject to constitutional restriction. Additionally, there is no
Fourteenth Amendment privacy interest in less sensitive affairs. Spetalieri, 36 F. Supp.
2d at 109.
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in the Harvard Law Review."' The market for information has undergone dramatic changes over the last century, and, as a result,
privacy torts cannot serve as a doctrinal foundation for regulating
online data exchange.
For many years, tort law has protected a cluster of privacy interests centered largely around the need for celebrities and other notable public figures to insulate themselves from overzealous public
scrutiny.'59 In an episode of The Simpsons guest starring Alec
Baldwin and Kim Basinger, Homer quips, '"Look, all I'm saying is,
if these big stars didn't want people going through their garbage
and saying they're gay, then they shouldn't have tried to express
themselves creatively."'" Famous people have always had to guard
their privacy closely because there has always been money to be
made in celebrity gossip, which is really nothing more than valuable personal information. With the advent of the World Wide
Web, however, it can be lucrative to gather information about anybody. Costs of collection, storage, and search have fallen to such a
degree that now more than just celebrities are concerned about
protocols for managing personal information."' The threat to which
law must respond is no longer merely that of people like Homer
Simpson slandering celebrities and pawing through their trash, but
that of highly organized companies systematically collecting and
selling data about ordinary people. The market for information has
changed in ways that render existing privacy torts a particularly
clumsy doctrinal vehicle for addressing many modern privacy concerns.
The Second Restatement of Torts delineates four distinct actions
for invasion of privacy: unreasonable intrusion into another's seclusion, appropriation of another's name or likeness, unreasonable
publicity given to another's private life, and publicity that unrea" Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev.
193 (1890).
59The exceptions to this generalization primarily involve the "Intrusion Upon Seclusion" tort. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C (1977).
60The Simpsons: When You Dish Upon a Star (Fox television broadcast, Nov. 8,
1998).
...
"'Is freedom inversely related to the efficiency of the available means of surveillance? If so, we have much to fear."' Lessig, supra note 9, at 18 (quoting James Boyle,
Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society 4 (1996)).
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sonably places another in a false light before the public.162 None of
these actions
would be useful in addressing clickstream privacy
163
concerns.
The false light tort plainly cannot apply because the relevant
data does not represent false information." The publicity tort cannot apply because it generally requires that the information be
made available for public consumption. Intrusion upon seclusion
and misappropriation are therefore the only conceivable tort
actions available for protecting clickstream privacy interests.
The intrusion upon seclusion tort sets an extremely high bar for
liability. The intrusion must (1) be into either a person's personal
seclusion or her "private affairs," and (2) be "highly offensive to a
reasonable person.' 65 Courts appear unlikely to consider online intrusions as exhibiting either of these characteristics. 66 Clickstream
data represents a record of which browsers downloaded which
pages. For the action to lie, either the information contained in the
cookie or the fact that this information can be associated with
viewing certain content must be a "private matter." The data in the
cookie itself may be personal, but it is rarely private. 67 One would
also have a difficult time characterizing as an "intrusion" the fact
that the collecting agent knows characteristics about the person to
whom it is delivering content-particularly when offline commercial transactions generate this sort of information all the time. Of
equal importance is that courts seem unwilling to characterize
M

'6Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652A-652E (1977).
163 See Jenab, supra note 22, at 655-56; Schwartz, supra note 20, at 778-79; Belgum,
supra note 8,
19-23.
64See Belgum, supra note 8,
1 20.
165
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 625B (1977).
'66See
Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (rejecting intrusion claim against charge card company for selling card holder names, scored
by purchase patterns, for remarketing). Moreover, most would agree that clickstream
data is less "personal" than a profile of purchase habits associated with a name and
address or phone number as in Dwyer. Finally, courts tend to reject such claims when
the information is ceded "voluntarily," and the fact that most browsers can be configured to reject cookies would likely be sufficient to satisfy this "voluntariness" requirement. See Helms, supra note 21, at 310.

16

The cookie may contain a zip code or an indication that the user prefers golf over

tennis, but that information is not generally considered private. See Belgum, supra
note 8, %23 (explaining that personal data is not synonymous with private data).
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these practices as "highly offensive to a reasonable person,"" the
second element of an intrusion claim.
Examination of misappropriation tort cases reveals that liability

attaches only when a defendant uses a recognizable person's image
or likeness to endorse a particular thing. 7 ' Although the misappropriation tort protects people from certain unauthorized uses of
identities, this protection does not extend to the exchange of facts
about ordinary people. In Cox v. Hatch, several workers objected
to their appearance in a campaign photo with Orrin Hatch.17 ' The
court rejected the misappropriation claim in part because their
identities did not have "intrinsic value.' '

'2

The word "intrinsic" is

inappropriate because even if an identity can be said to possess

"value," that value is not in any sense primordial or inherent. The
value of someone's identity or likeness is what the market is willing
to pay for it. To say that celebrities' identities have worth is to say

that people would be willing to pay for their likeness. The workers'
identities did not lack "intrinsic value" because there is no such
thing. The proper way of understanding why the workers were not
deprived of economic value is that their identities' market value
was sufficiently close to zero that the unauthorized use did not de-

prive them of any economic gain. Paul McCartney's likeness is
worth something because (1) people respond positively to a perceived association with Paul McCartney, and (2) there are not
many Paul McCartneys. Conversely, John Doe's likeness is not
worth much because (1) an endorsement from John Doe is not

uniquely compelling, and (2) there are many substitute John Does.
Unauthorized use of John Doe's identity does not deprive him of

an economic gain because no lucrative possibilities existed for him
'6 See Helms, supra note 21, at 311 ("[lIt is not likely that even the most detailed
profile would rise to the level of a 'highly offensive' disclosure of a private fact.").
"' See Helms, supra note 21, at 311 ("[I]t is not likely that even the most detailed

profile would rise to the level of a 'highly offensive' disclosure of a private fact.").
70See, e.g., Shibley v. Time, Inc., 341 N.E.2d 337, 339 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975) ("It is
clear from a reading of the authorities dealing with invasion of privacy that the 'appropriation or exploitation of one's personality' referred to ... refers to those situations where the plaintiff's name or likeness is displayed to the public to indicate that
the plaintiff indorses the defendant's product or business."). Cases where courts have
relied on the misappropriation tort in relation to facts are limited to "hot-news." See,
eig., NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841,853 (2d Cir. 1997).
761 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1988).
72 Id. at 564.
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to sell his identity in the first place. The distinction between the
court's characterization of economic value and that presented here
would be of little consequence in Cox, but would be extremely important in analyzing clickstream data collection precisely because
in such a context an ordinary person's identity does have market
value.
The analytic clarification in the preceding paragraph pushes the
misappropriation tort further towards cognizability in the clickstream context because, under that understanding, the presense or
absence of value does not turn on a user's status as ordinary. Despite this clarification, the misappropriation action would still fail
to mediate online data collection because the objection to unauthorized identity use is not the revelation of the identity itself, but
rather the use of that entity to endorse something. In Tropeano v.
Atlantic Monthly Co., for example, a court rejected a misappropriation claim against The Atlantic Monthly when a woman objected to
her appearance in a photo associated with a story about changing
sexual mores.'73 The court invoked the "incidental use" doctrine in
the process of rejecting the claim.'74
The magazine did not, the court reasoned, appropriate the
woman's specific likeness for pecuniary gain-the photo was just
illustrative. The author merely used the picture to describe the
change in mores. Comment (d) of the Restatement suggests, and
the Tropeano court seems to accept, that if one appropriates an
identity for a description rather than for an endorsement then
courts do not consider that identity to be misappropriated.'75
..
3 400 N.E.2d 847, 848 (Mass. 1980).
114 Id. at 850-51. The incidental
use doctrine states:
The value of the plaintiff's name is not appropriated by mere mention of it, or
by reference to it in connection with legitimate mention of his public activities;
nor is the value of his likeness appropriated when it is published for purposes
other than taking advantage of his reputation, prestige, or other value associated with him, for purposes of publicity. No one has the right to object merely
because his name or his appearance is brought before the public, since neither is
in any way a private matter and both are open to public observation. It is only
when the publicity is given for the purpose of appropriating to the defendant's

benefit the commercial or other values associated with the name or the likeness
that the right of privacy is invaded.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C cmt. d (1977).
7' See Tropeano, 400 N.E.2d at 850; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C cmt. d

(1977).
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Cookie data is used for describing and predicting behavior, not as a
means of using one person's identity or visage to manipulate the
behavior of another. Less abstractly, a successful misappropriation
claim seems to require that the plaintiff's identity be used in some
sort of publication. Clickstream data, however, is almost never
published and in the rare instances when it is, the data is almost
always anonymous and aggregated.'76
Even if privacy torts could be strained to the point of relevance
in the clickstream context, applying them would be economically
undesirable. First, the inevitable reference to some objective standard of reasonableness introduces substantial uncertainty into the
status of legal liability.'77 Because both websites and users would,
ceteris paribus, disfavor greater risk, such legal ambiguity would
chill both data collection and web surfing.'
Second, even if the standard were clear, few would sue. Tortious
damage would generally be both small and dispersed amongst a
tremendous number of users. Although class action lawsuits are
designed to remedy precisely these conditions,"' in the clickstream
context they are sufficiently extreme that even the transaction cost
of participating in a class action could dwarf the return on litigation. Even more importantly, the character of the injury is such
that it imposes transaction costs associated with identifying the appropriate class of plaintiffs.
Third, even if people sued, calibrating damages so as to encourage socially optimal data collection would be impossible. Ideally, a
76In

other words, when clickstream data is published, it is not published in such a

way that indicates that Person 1 did A, Person 2 did B, etc., but instead the information is aggregated into broad generalizations like "the class of people with these characteristics tended to behave in the following way." See, e.g., John Chandler-Pepelnjak
& Jaymee Johnson, New Industry Benchmarks: Purchase and Registration Drop-off
Rates, Atlas Institute, at http://atlasdmt.com/media/pdfs/insights/DMIDropeview.pdf
(2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (detailing consumer "dropoff" rates aggregated by industry).
" For a discussion of the implications of juror-imposed uncertainty, see Goetz, supra note 141, at 299-302.
178For a discussion of why uncertainty can diminish participant utility relative to a
certain outcome with the same expected value, see id. at 75-82.
"' See Owen M. Fiss, The Political Theory of the Class Action, 53 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 21, 24 (1996) ("In short, the class action could be viewed as a device to fund the
private attorney general and is able to play that role because of the aggregation of the
claims of a large number of persons who have similar or identical claims, none of
which-standing alone-would justify the suit.").
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tort regime would seek to assess liability only where the value of
the unauthorized use (DUVU,h) is less than VUser Private actors are
likely to pursue this socially optimal strategy only where their
marginal private cost equals the marginal social cost. The only way
courts can force socially optimal information practices is therefore
to calibrate the damages to reflect the marginal social cost. A
number of violations will doubtlessly go unreported, so the damage
measure for those that are successfully litigated would also have to
impose a penalty in disproportion to the injury incurred by the
user. The coefficient by which to scale the damage measure up or
down, however, would be pure guesswork."
Finally, even a perfectly administered liability rule would destroy potentially beneficial gains from trade. People have highly
differentiated privacy preferences,"' meaning that some strongly
value their privacy while others do not. If downloading a web page
is viewed as a transaction (content for information), some people
would be willing to make this exchange with few restrictions, while
others would make the exchange only after securing the most
stringent protection. A prophylactic standard'" eliminates possible
gains from trade associated with such highly differentiated preferences. ' A single, perfectly administered standard imputes to each
user the preference of the average. A rule set at this average would
therefore (1) fail to protect those whose preference is above the
average and (2) foreclose the possibility of mutually beneficial
transactions with those parties whose preference is below it.

" An appropriate coefficient would have to incorporate a figure representing the
percentage of cognizable claims that, for one reason or another, are not filed. The
very nature of these claims, however, makes measuring the frequency with which they
occur almost impossible.
...
See Cranor et al., supra note 28.
" It may strike one as odd to refer to a tort standard as prophylactic because most
tort cases involve ex post assessments. One may justify such a proposition, however,
because the context in which courts gauge the reasonableness of behavior is unlikely
to change. What is reasonable to do with clickstream data collected on one website,
for example, is likely very similar to what is reasonable to do with data collected on
another. Any variation in the standard, then, would more likely be attributable to the

subjective variation of juries rather than objective differences in context.
Cranor et al., supra note 28 ("[I]t seems unlikely that a one-size-fits-all approach
to online privacy is likely to succeed.").
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In sum, existing privacy law is neither doctrinally appropriate
nor economically desirable as a vehicle for addressing clickstream
privacy concerns.
V. TOWARDS A REGIME OF DEFAULT ENTITLEMENTS

A. Oversight of Default Models
Promulgating a scheme of statutory default entitlements around
which users and collecting agents could bargain could be, under
certain conditions, a viable means of both protecting user expectations and preserving gains from trade. As intimated in Part III, the
most important such condition is low bargaining costs. Default entitlement proposals (many times in the form of majoritarian contract default rules) for regulating personal data exchange are nothing new," although to this author's knowledge no scholars have
advocated such solutions for clickstream data. Default models are
most desirable where transaction and enforcement costs do not
dwarf the value of the underlying good being traded. Only recently
has the advent of new browser technology and web surfing protocols rendered such a default system feasible.
Some opponents critical of more prophylactic tort standards
have advocated propertizing online data."' This property paradigm,
theorists reason, would avoid the opportunity costs of applying a
prophylactic standard to a privacy context with highly differentiated preferences and would preserve users' autonomy to control
how their data would be used. Intellectual property law, however,

'84 See,

e.g., Kang, supra note 44, at 1246-59 (arguing for default rules vesting rights

in consumers for anything other than "functionally necessary" information); Murphy,
supra note 102, at 2407-17 (endorsing contractual privacy). I call this a "pseudocontract" scheme because it would actually have to be a statutory scheme that imposed contract-like obligations on the basis of parameters determined by interaction
between a user agent and the website.
,' See, e.g., Kenneth C. Laudon, Extensions to the Theory of Markets and Privacy:
Mechanics of Pricing Information, in Privacy and Self-Regulation in the Information
Age 41, 42-43 (U.S. Dep't of Commerce ed., 1997), available at http://www.ntia.
doc.gov/reports/privacy/selfregl..htm (advocating a property regime). Professor Alan
F. Westin first proposed the idea of propertizing personal information in 1967.
Westin, supra note 11, at 324-25. For a discussion of the contexts in which government institutions have recognized property interests in facts, see Hatch, supra note 7,
at 1467-68.
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has stubbornly refused to propertize facts,'86 and it is doubtful
whether those advocating property rights in information could advance a compelling economic argument for clickstream data's
being excepted. Aside from broader concerns regarding the social
value of freely flowing information, the costs of enforcing property
rights over facts almost surely exceed the costs of ensuring exclusive use protectively.'8 7 A relationship to a piece of information
mediated by property law is a right against the world,'" whereas a
relationship to that same piece of information mediated by contract is merely a right against the entity with whom the disclosing
agent is transacting. First, property rules fail to promote the utility
objective because data buyers (collecting agents and secondary
purchasers) would have to secure from the user the right to buy
and use the data, imposing substantial transaction costs that would
make almost any secondary data use impossible. Second, property
rules also fail to protect users in that they may be forced to make
an all-or-nothing decision without being able to attach conditions
to data collection. The reason for this problem is that the First
Amendment protects non-contractually restricted speech (data disclosure) about information a speaker has legally acquired. 9
Courts, however, have consistently held that bargained-for restrictions on the right to speak trump a speaker's First Amendment
right to disclose information.'"
' See Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345-47 (1991).
For example, it costs a man less to control information exchange regarding his
receding hairline by wearing a hat than it would cost society to control this sort of exchange by enforcing some sort of property right in this fact.
" See Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the
"Newtonian" World of On-line Commerce, 12 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 115, 121-22 (1997)
("The difference is that a bilateral agreement applies only between contracting parties, whereas a restraint on alienation 'runs with the property,' and hence interferes
with all potential future parties as well.").
" Courts will generally enforce contracts not to speak, but not property rights
against those seeking to disclose information that the speaker has legally acquired.
See Ellen Alderman & Caroline Kennedy, The Right to Privacy 329 (1995) (noting
that property ownership of personal information is at odds with the First Amendment). But see L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 34
(1999) (rejecting a facial challenge to a statutory amendment limiting commercial users' access to arrestee addresses). For a general discussion of the tension between privacy and the First Amendment, see Goodale et al., supra note 139.
" See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 665 (1991) (holding that the
First Amendment does not prohibit one from recovering promissory estoppel dam-
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Prophylactic P rivacy
Standard

N

Privacy Preference Intensity
Figure I

A model that allocates default entitlements between the user
and the collecting agent and then allows them to bargain around
the baseline enjoys several additional advantages over models
premised on more prophylactic standards. First, the concept of default rules can impute to an exchange certain implied conditions
when the parties fail to contract for express conditions. These defaults play a critical role in forcing valuable information from both
the user and from the collecting agent. Second, a contract model
can accommodate the highly differentiated set of expectations-an
invaluable feature in the clickstream context because, as Figure 1

ages for a publisher's breach of a confidentiality promise that was given in exchange
for information); see also Volokh, supra note 12, at 1057-61 (arguing that courts may
even recognize implied contractual privacy terms).
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illustrates, VUser can vary significantly from user to user.'"' If users'
privacy preferences are highly differentiated, then although a standard set at the "reasonable expectation" may well enforce the average expectation, that average will rarely reflect VUser for any given
consumer. Any prophylactic damage measure failing to enforce an
actual valuation either overdeters secondary data use (where Vuser
is lower than that protected by the standard) or undercompensates
the user (where Vuse, is higher) for her violated expectation. Such a
damage measure, then, would simultaneously constrain gains from
trade (undermining the utility objective) and underprotect user expectations (undermining the compensatory objective). The statistical corollary of these propositions is that, from a pure utility standpoint, the desirability of a prophylactic privacy standard is
inversely related to the standard deviation of VUer . "

The requisite assumptions of such a bargaining model were, until
recently, so preposterous that, although thinkers posed contractual
defaults for other informational privacy quagmires, they rightfully
ignored such possibilities in the clickstream context. Clickstream
default proposals have escaped academic attention for several reasons. First, the high transaction costs of bargaining rendered making explicit the obligations of clickstream data exchange not worth
the benefit of exchanging it. Second, no compelling mechanism existed for discerning individual reservation prices in a context where
user valuations were highly differentiated. Third, enforcement of
an expectation damage measure (in this scheme the reservation
price, VUser) would have been so expensive that it would have suffo-

cated gains from trade, rendering otherwise mutually beneficial
transactions economically undesirable for either the user or the
collecting agent. These conditions have led most to call for either a
common law or statutory remedy predicated on prophylactic rules
regarding what collecting agents may do with clickstream data
when they acquire it from users. If, however, one could engineer a
distribution with a small mean. Although the absolute
1 represents a VUser
value of the distribution around the mean is likely small (because the mean itself is so
infinitesimal), the relative size of the dispersion remains crucial to the analysis.
92Because a larger standard deviation implies greater dispersion around the mean,
9' Figure

the greater the standard deviation, the greater the dispersal around the mean, and the
greater the degree to which a prophylactic standard would either undercompensate or
overdeter.
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market environment that inexpensively created, stored, and enforced expectations, then one could only justify such inflexible
rules on paternalistic grounds (namely, that people should want
more privacy than they do). Ultimately, the bargaining model
would be "Pareto superior" because unlike the inflexible rules, it
would improve the position of all those involved.
B. The Platformfor Privacy Preferences ("P3P")
The Platform for Privacy Preferences ("P3P") project has enjoyed intense intellectual scrutiny for several years.' 3 P3P is a
product of the World Wide Web Consortium ("W3C") and represents a set of recommended protocols governing information exchange over the Internet.'' 4 The debate surrounding the ultimate
viability of P3P remains extremely volatile, with the protocols receiving treatment from commentators that ranges from unabashed
enthusiasm to scathing derision.' 5 This Note's discussion, however,
involves only the protocols for clickstream data and may therefore
be exempt from some of the more extreme characterizations of
P3P as a whole. Although P3P may indeed be an invaluable tool
for mediating certain informational privacy contexts, people should
remain skeptical of claims of its talismanic significance in others.
Microsoft's most recent browser product, Internet Explorer 6.0,
uses P3P as its cookie-handling protocol.'" Some earlier browser
versions have a more inchoate protocol that either rejects or accepts all cookies.'97 Some commentators have reported version 6.0
"See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 9, at 160-63 (discussing the possibility of using P3P in
conjunction with a legal remedy); Rosen, supra note 11, at 172.
9The
full P3P specification can be found at World Wide Web Consortium, at
http://www.w3.org/tr/p3p/ (last visited July 5, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
"' See, e.g., William McGeveran, Programmed Privacy Promises: P3P and Web Privacy Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1812, 1815 (2001) (espousing P3P as a means of creating
a privacy market); Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture
of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't Get), 2001 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 1, $1 75-89 (2001)
(leveling numerous criticisms at P3P).
196See Aaron Goldfeder & Lisa Leibfried, Privacy in Internet Explorer 6, at
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/en-us/dnpriv/htmi/ie6privacyfeature.asp?frame=
true (last updated Oct. 16, 2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
"' See Jeffrey Benner, MS Gets Privacy-Happy With New IE, Wired News, at
http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,43686,00.html (May 15, 2001) (on file with
the Virginia Law Review Association).
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market penetration to be as high as 30%,9' and that figure will

surely increase. As collecting agents increasingly deploy the protocol, one can expect the next generation of browsers to be equipped
with some sort of cookie-handling feature and that companies like
Microsoft will set the defaults.'"
Under the "Internet Options" tab of the Microsoft Internet Explorer software 6.0 there is a tab for "Privacy."2" Although there
are a number of online privacy issues,"' these settings deal exclusively with cookies. There are six gradations of cookie-handling
from which the consumer may choose: accept all cookies, low, medium, medium-high, high, and block all cookies." The default setting is medium, which, among other things, blocks any cookies
from servers without compact privacy policies."3 Under the P3P
cookie-handling functionality deployed by Explorer, when a user
first types the URL address into the browser, the browser requests
a privacy policy reference file from all collecting agents (domains)
serving cookie content into that web page. " These agents generally
consist of the website and any affiliates or advertisers also serving code
into that page. If the site has what is called a "compact privacy policy,"
the collecting agent will return the reference file detailing the location

'98
Scarlet Pruitt, Internet Explorer 6.0 Leaves Netscape Behind, IDG News Service,
at http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,91483,00.asp (Mar. 27, 2002) (on file
with the Virginia Law Review Association).
'9See James Tierney, Remarks at the Technology Law Center at the University of
Maine School of Law (June 2001), in Internet Privacy Law, Policy, and Practice:
State, Federal, and International Perspectives, 54 Me. L. Rev. 95, 111 (2002).
However, the default levels will, of course, be set by the person in the company
who owns your operating system. So, I want you to go out and look all across
the country and decide which operating system you all have. Ninety-six percent
of us have one from one company and it will decide the level of default that you
will have, and nobody will ever change that default.
Id.
See Goldfeder & Leibfried, supra note 196.
0, See supra notes 16-29 and accompanying text.
' See How to Manage Cookies in Internet Explorer 6, Microsoft Knowledge Base
Article, at http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;en-us;283185 (last visited Feb. 21, 2003) [hereinafter How to Manage Cookies] (on file with the Virginia
Law Review Association).
203 A user may actually input customized settings, but this functionality is beyond the
scope of this discussion.
These cookies could be from first or third parties. How to Manage Cookies, supra
note 202.
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of that policy to the browser."5 The browser will then request the
XML- (Extensible Markup Language) encoded compact privacy policy, which it then compares to the user's preset privacy preferences.2" If
the collecting agent's treatment of cookies conforms to the userdetermined parameters, it may set the cookie in the manner stipulated by the browser setting.2 "7 All of this (aside from the user setting her preferences) occurs almost instantaneously. The user does
not, as in some earlier generations of browsers, 8 receive a prompt
every time a collecting agent tries to set a cookie, thereby incurring
significant transaction costs in attempting to protect her privacy. If
a collecting agent attempts to set a cookie that is either blocked or
downgraded by the browser, a little red icon signaling that event
appears in the bottom right corner of the screen."' If the user
wishes to investigate the specifics of the rejection or modification,2'
she can click on that icon for a report.
C. Default Rules
The concept of default rules has certainly received attention in
the online context. " In 1989, Professors Ian Ayres and Robert
Gertner wrote an enormously influential article on the appropriate
criteria for default rule selection." ' Professor Jerry Kang has systematically incorporated those criteria into a contract-based pro2OLaurie

Cranor, P3P: A More Detailed Look, The O'Reilly Network, at

http://www.oreillynet.com/lpt/a/l554 (last visited Feb. 21, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
206Id.
...
Usually this will either be a "block" or an "accept," but certain settings provide
that certain types of cookies be either "leashed" or "restricted." A leashed cookie is
one that can be read only by the agent that issued it. A restricted cookie is treated like
a "session cookie" and is deleted when the user closes her browser. See Goldfeder &
Leibfried, supra note 196.
208 In Internet Explorer 5.5, the user can either reject all
cookies, accept all cookies,
or be prompted every time a collecting agent attempts to set a cookie. See Benner,

supra note 197.
See Goldfeder & Leibfried, supra note 196.
2,0Upon clicking on the report she will see a pop-up window detailing all
of the
cookies that collecting agents with material on that page seek to assign to her
browser. The window will explain how each cookie was treated-whether it was accepted, blocked, leashed, or converted to a session cookie. Id.
See Kang, supra note 44, at 1246-59.
212 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87 (1989).
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posal for the collection of non-clickstream personal information

(such as that collected during purchase or registration). 23 Kang
likely failed to treat clickstream data for largely the same reasons
as did other commentators-the transaction costs associated with
making explicit the conditions of data exchange would dwarf the
value of the data point itself.21 ' The integration of new browser

technology with P3P protocols depresses the transaction costs involved in securing express obligations from collecting agents and,
in so doing, crowds out fewer data exchanges that, in the face of
larger contracting costs, would not be worthwhile for the user nor
for the collecting agent.

Ayres and Gertner's seminal paper takes two major positions.
First, they argue that penalty defaults, or default rules that force
one of the transacting parties to reveal certain critical pieces of information to the other, may be justified where information asymmetries would otherwise allow one party to protect its "share of the

pie" by strategically withholding information at the expense of the
collective "size of the pie."2 '5 Second, Professors Ayres and Gertner
attack arguments for majoritarian defaults that employ criteria resembling rules that most people would choose."6 This condition,
they argue, holds only when (1) the losses associated with not being able to "flip out" of each of the two default rules are equiva-

lent,"7 and (2) the transaction costs of flipping, for each default
rule, are also equivalent.2 8 It may in some cases make sense to have
"' He concluded that the default should vest the right only to "functionally necessary" information with the collecting agents. Kang, supra note 44, at 1201.
214This is not to say that clickstream data is not valuable, but simply that the value
of a single clickstream data point and that of the page view for which it is traded are
sufficiently small that even a minor inconvenience would probably be enough to cause
the user to view another page. A collecting agent may be more willing than a user to
engage in this sort of bargaining, but only because it could have millions of such interactions and could therefore capture returns from scale on bargaining for these data
points.
'5This statement is a more colloquial way of saying that this posture is justified
where otherwise one of the parties, in the interest of capturing a greater fraction of
the surplus from the bargain, would selectively conceal information the revelation of
which would have increased the overall surplus to be shared by both parties to the
bargain. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 212, at 94.
2 Id. at 89-91.
2. To "flip out" means to switch from the default term to the other option. "Flipping
out" is the terminology used by Jerry Kang. See Kang, supra note 44, at 1257.
2' See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 212, at 114-15.
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a minority default where flipping out is less expensive and/or failure to flip entails a less significant loss for one of the parties.
In part because the transaction costs of a user flip would likely
be the same without regard to how the default itself is set,' this
discussion focuses primarily (1) on the loss associated with users
getting "stuck" with an undesirable term, and (2) on the first part
of the argument, the information-forcing function of default rules.
The following is a discussion of the desired informational defaults
for P3P cookie protocols.
What is unique, indeed unprecedented, about clickstream defaults is that they can literally be encoded for every exchange of
clickstream data. They are not there as "gap-fillers," but are technologically embedded as conditions for each page view. P3P
cookie-handling devices epitomize the "code" that Professor Lawrence Lessig sees as the linchpin of cyber-governanceY If the
transacting parties achieve a proxied agreement on expectations
based upon either default privacy preferences or those input by the
user, the default settings effectively are the default legal rules. As
long as a legal regime enforces the expectation as expressed by the
browser menu, legal defaults deviating from their technical analogues would be inefficient because, in every instance, one would
have to override the other. Moreover, the default settings exhibit a
tremendous amount of inertia because (1) many do not know
about them, and (2) if they do, they may not be comfortable changing them. The default browser settings should therefore be subjected to intense scrutiny. Except for the first point, the following
discussion deals largely with default "rules" insofar as the encoded
browser settings reify them.
First, the default rules should apply only when the user has a
browser that would enable her to express her expectations using
the browser's privacy menu. It may be possible to bargain over
terms without the browser features, but such dickering is more expensive (in terms of effort) than is an automated exchange between browser and server. To the extent that the fixed cost of acquiring the browser technology is small (one can download
211Irrespective

of the default settings, in order to change them the user would still

have to go to the same privacy menu. The difference resides merely in the button she
would click to do it.
22"Lessig, supra note 9, at 160.
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Explorer 6.0 for free), a default term construed against users-in
other words, one that locates most of the "ownership" of a clickstream data point with the collecting agent-in the event that they
fail to use browsers with cookie-handling functionality
encourages
221
them to proctire browsers with this feature.
Second, the default browser settings should (and currently do)
block cookies from collecting agents that have no compact, machine-readable privacy policy. This setting forces information
about data usage from collecting agents because it penalizes those
that do not provide a clear and instantaneously readable privacy
policy. This default setting eliminates problems associated with
web operators concealing and manipulating current privacy policies so as to protect their "piece of the pie."
Third, the defaults should and do "leash" all first-party cookies,
meaning that only the issuing collecting agent may read them. Most
people appreciate the benefits of personalization,2 although many
may not realize that cookies and customization are related. Keeping a virtual "shopping cart" and having news items that are of
idiosyncratic interest placed prominently on news sites are two examples of the advantages cookies confer upon users. 3 Many people, however, would not consent to a cookie placed by one site that
may be read by other, unidentified sites. Consumers should be responsible for understanding that websites do set cookies, but they
should not be responsible for knowing, without being told, which
third parties may read them. A default that accepted cookies readable by third parties would chill web surfing by introducing more
uncertainty into the clickstream collection context.224 Because consumers do appreciate the gains from personalization associated
with a leashed first-party cookie, a blanket default set to reject all
first-party cookies linking clickstream data to personal information
would either (1) stick a number of people with a rule that, absent
22 This

setting is particularly important because otherwise users would lack an in-

centive to get the browser that allows users and collecting agents to make explicit the
exact privacy terms.
222In one survey, seventy-eight percent of respondents indicated that "they would
definitely or probably agree to Web sites using persistent identifiers... to provide a
customized service." Cranor et al., supra note 28.
" Cookies are used to link a user with material that that user has placed in the
shopping cart. That information is stored in the collecting agent's database.
" See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
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the costs of contracting, they would rather contract around or (2)
force those who indeed elect to contract around it to incur gratuitously the costs of doing so. Devising a default rule leashing firstparty cookies therefore avoids the transaction costs associated with
a rule that blocks them entirely and eliminates uncertainty by forcing websites to explicitly and specifically identify any additional entities that may enjoy access to the cookies.
Finally, the defaults should accept anonymous, third-party cookies. The presence of third-party cookies evokes the strongest reaction from users because these files allow collecting agents to compile user profiles across a number of sites.225 This concern

represents a reaction to the "dossier effect" because a single collecting agent can monitor and compile behavior across a variety of
contexts. That being said, such dossier effects are less objectionable
to the extent that they are anonymous, meaning that they cannot
be tied to any personally identifiable information. The difference
between personally identifiable dossiers and anonymous ones is
roughly the difference between a pharmacy knowing the identity of
a person buying a certain mix of medication and the mere fact that
a person is buying it. A cookie is "anonymous" if the third party
does not collect it to associate it with, or set it to contain, a name,
an email address, a real-space address, a social security number, or
any other information that could be used to identify the behavior
of the associated person in the real world. Without certainty regarding uses to which the data may be put offline, the average informed consumer would attach a highly negative valuation to the
third-party use of personally identifiable clickstream data.
Some would go even further and maintain that the default
should block third-party cookies entirely. Such a setting would be a
terrible misstep, as it is little exaggeration to say that targeted advertising is the lifeblood of free publications. 26 Those desiring a default that does not accept third-party cookies would respond by arguing (1) that disallowing third-party cookies would not represent
a death knell for online targeted advertising, and (2) that those us225In

one survey, only forty-four percent indicated that they would agree to allow an

identifier to provide advertising across a number of websites. Cranor et al., supra note
28.
...
See Dorothy Kabakeris, How to Find Investment Information on the Web, 3 No.
21 Law. J. 8, 8 (2001).
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ers desiring third-party cookies could just adjust the privacy menu
from the default to reflect such preferences.
With respect to the first point, targeted advertising would persist, but with the same limitations as exist offline. Certain publications cater to targeted audiences, and third-party advertisers would
retain the ability to talk to that audience generally, but they would
not be able to differentiate within that audience. The ability to differentiate within the broader audience of a targeted publication is
the advantage of advertising online versus off. Advertisers are willing to pay a premium for online advertising precisely because when
third parties serve an advertisement to a user, they can target the
material pursuant to that user's cookie history.227 If default rules effectively disable this targeting capability then many web publishers
that subsist on advertising revenue would be forced either to go
under or to switch to other revenue models. Consumers would find
themselves either without the same selection of content or having
to pay more for it.
With respect to the second point, the question is not quite fair. If
a user never had to internalize the costs of a decision to refuse
third-party cookies then it is quite possible that she would elect to
block them. A user internalizes the effects of her decision to block
first-party cookies by sacrificing the personalization that the cookie
provides. Unless websites can efficiently calibrate access or service
to reflect the aggregate advertising loss inflicted by a single user's
decision to block a third-party cookie, however, the user will not
have to internalize the cost of her decision.
Again, the point may be expressed as a mathematical relationship. The user captures all the return on her decision to refuse the
cookie, RBlock_ but shares the aggregate burden in the form of sacrificed advertising opportunity, LAdV..,Mifg, with the rest of the users on
the website. Forcing users to internalize the costs of the decision to
block third-party cookies would necessitate the Herculean technical undertaking of segmenting a site's web service along another
dimension-whether the user accepts third-party cookies. If websites cannot segment their service offering so as to force users to
incur 100% of LAdvertising , then each user on a website with an audi227By

"premium" I mean to suggest that advertisers pay more than they otherwise

would if they could not differentiate within a vendor audience.
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ence of size N will reject third-party cookies as long as R Bock_.3> LAd2
" Consequently, users systematically undervalue third/eNisIN
party cookies. In sum, the argument that most consumers would
elect to block third-party cookies is misleading because their deci229
sion to do so rarely reflects the true cost of blocking them. Moreover, when advertisers use targeted ads, many times their intention
is to use knowledge about the cookie to control for different testing
variables, not to ruthlessly exploit knowledge of web-surfing habz3
itS230
its.
VI. DAMAGES AND ENFORCEMENT

A. InappropriateDamage Measures
Reserving private causes of action exclusively for individual users fails to implement an appropriate litigious check on collecting
agents. The following Section argues that a regime seeking to adequately address both compensatory and utility objectives should
enforce expectations not through the private suits of those injured
by violation of the privacy term, but instead through a statutory
scheme of regulatory fines or penalties for violating default or bargained-for entitlements. While contract law represents an effective
blueprint for structuring exchanges and for identifying the scope of
the appropriate damages, inherent limitations involving the coststo-return ratio of litigation render the private cause of action, relative to a statutory penalty, a far inferior means of protecting clickstream privacy.

228There

exist some simplifying assumptions for this assertion. First, the number of

users on a given website would have to be static. Second, all users would have to use
the site with the same frequency. That these assertions are plainly untrue, however,
does not seriously undermine the point. The fraction of the loss borne by a single user
may not be exactly 1/N, but will nevertheless be substantially less than one hundred
percent.
229One might recognize that setting the default to accept third-party cookies uses
one type of market imperfection (the friction of flipping out of the default rule) to
correct another type of market imperfection (externalities).
' See, e.g., Digital Marketing Insights, Atlas DMT, at http://atlasdmt.com
/insights/dm.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2003) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (chronicling a number of different tests using cookie data).
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The Achilles heel of almost every proposed privacy solution is
the mechanism for determining and enforcing damages.23' Should
the cause of action be private or public? What should the damage
measure be? In solutions where the cause of action resides with the
user, the damage award must be high enough to induce that user to
bring the cause of action.232 From an ex ante perspective, collecting
agents will not violate the privacy term if the return on the unauthorized use (recall that this is D UVu.nuh) is less than the expected
cost (to the violator) of violating the privacy term, CViolate' Forgetting for a moment that litigation costs the collecting agent money
and further assuming that all initiated suits are successful, then Cvi.
late is equal to the expected probability that a user brings a suit, PE,
times the magnitude of the damages, DE. (That is, Cviote, = P, * DE.)
Assuming that law should at least deter breaches when the breach
yields less value to the breacher than adherence yields for the potential victim (if D UVah < Vu. ),then DE must be large enough to
make the expected penalty greater than the value of the breach
(or, mathematically speaking, large enough to satisfy the condition
PE DE > DUVu,).When a cause of action resides with an individual user, D E would need to be extraordinarily high (because PE
is so low) in order to deter sufficiently breach of the privacy term.
There are two major problems with setting DE high enough to
correctly calibrate Ciote, . First, it fails as a compensatory measure
because DE would far exceed VU, the actual loss incurred by the
user.233 Second, if the purpose of calibrating Ciat,, is to encourage
data uses where D UVUnath > Vuser, then Ctio, should approximate
VUer.2 ' At high levels of DE, however, even slight errors in estimating PE would render Ciole a gross misapproximation for VU~er, and
these errors are almost unavoidable.
Some have argued that class-action lawsuits can effectively increase PE by allowing users to pool claims for small damages into

"'See Froomkin, supra note 9, at 1527 (noting that the United States may be unique
in having self-regulation without any enforcement mechanism).

...
See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
"The relationship between DE and P, is actually far more complicated, as neither

of the two variables is independent. Increasing D, would effectively increase the return on litigation, pulling P, upward.
2 This way, the decision to make unauthorized use of data despite the penalty, occurs only when that use garners a return higher than the user's privacy valuation.
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one suit.25 Transaction costs, however, still inhere in class-action
suits, and the damages are not likely large enough to induce people
to incur even a fraction of the costs of participating. Particularly
with respect to clickstream data, where the loss incurred by breach
of the privacy term is low relative to the costs of litigating, class action is not a viable mechanism for preserving a private cause of action. Advocates of class-action-related solutions may respond by
noting that there are many cases where a potential participant's individual stake may be very small, even several cents, but that response mistakenly assumes that the costs of identifying the class
are analogous. Identifying the class of persons whose privacy terms
are violated is probably a far more expensive proposition than is
that exercise for other groups of plaintiffs.236
Other proposals would grant a cause of action to the government
for violation of a prophylactic standard. Such proposals, however,
would enforce this standard at the expense of both compensatory
and utility objectives. A prophylactic statutory regime would fail to
protect differentiated expectations because the damages would not
be repaid to the users who incurred the loss (and even if they were,
they would not reflect VUser). 217 Moreover, the inability to correctly
calibrate D E so that collecting agents make unauthorized use of
data only where D UVUno,,,h > VUser leaves such strategies vulnerable
to the same problems as are detailed at the end of Part IV.
238
B. Clickstream Nanocontracting

The discussion surrounding the user reservation price wastes ink
if there exists no feasible mechanism for identifying VUer. Prophylactic rules labor under a crude approximation for the average VU,,r,
so a statutory scheme predicated on a low cost mechanism for identifying the subjective VUse, for each cookie, akin to the P3P mechanism for identifying the scope of the privacy term itself, would be
231See supra notes 1.79-80 and accompanying text.

26 It would be more expensive in part because of the costs associated with executing
subpoenas to force violators to provide the list of users.
23 They would not be repaid unless the government remitted payments to those users whose privacy terms were violated.
2"SAs used in this Note, the term "contract" does not invoke the idea of contractual
remedies. A "nanocontract" is merely a convenient way of describing the very small
agreement.
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quite attractive. The most sensible point in the process of clickstream data exchange to identify Vue, would reside at a technical
bottleneck-some attendant digital exchange that must occur between every user and every collecting agent. Browsers are the most
obvious technical bottleneck for such clickstream exchanges because in order for a user to view a page there must be some communication between the browser and the collecting agent's server.
It is precisely this bottleneck property that rendered the browser
the ripest vehicle for communicating the privacy term itself. Just as
the newest generation of browsers can effectively encode a privacy
term, so too can they serve as a mechanism for identifying Vue,.
This valuation could be represented by a reservation price, PR
that conveys V,Uer and, like the privacy term, may be set as a default
according to a schedule. The schedule would vary with respect to
the level of privacy preference itself, with stricter privacy terms defaulting to lower reservation prices."' The language of this clause
would be to the effect of, "I would be willing to allow this collecting agent to breach these expectations for $[ PR]." Although courts
could hypothetically enforce the reservation price as a liquidated
damages clause, legislatures could bypass many of the idiosyncrasies of contract doctrine by promulgating an alternative statutory
enforcement scheme. This scheme could assess severe penalties for
failure to return PR to the user independent of any common-law
contract doctrine. Section VI.C discusses this possibility in more
detail.
The reasons why default values for PR (it may at times be useful
to conceptualize this value as a liquidated damage) should be inversely related to the stringency of the privacy term require a little
elaboration. Consider the following seven variables, several of
which are used in earlier analysis: PR, representing the reservation
price that approximates Vuser; D UV,,,,,h, representing the value of a
single unauthorized data use (unauthorized means that the use
breaches the privacy term); D UVU,,,lh..oo,, representing the value of
a single profitable, unauthorized data use; D UV,,,,,,h, unprofit representing the value of a single unprofitable, unauthorized data use;
23 9

239

One would expect P, to approach Vs,, because one is generally willing to accept
value at least equivalent to the value she places on the term.
240See infra this Section.
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SDUUnath, representing the size of the set of unauthorized uses
(both profitable and unprofitable); SDUUnauahrofI(a subset of SD Uu.
data
auth), representing the size of the set of profitable, unauthorized
uses; SD Unauth-unprofit (also a subset of SDUUnauth),9 representing the
size of the set of unprofitable, unauthorized data uses. A collecting
agent will breach a privacy term if the potential use is profitable,
that is, where DUVU,J,,, > PI. One should conceptualize the privacy
term as a line dividing the total set of potential data uses into those
that are authorized by the privacy term and those that are not
(SD UUauh), with the latter being further subdivided into SDUun.
auhprofit and SD UUnauthunprofi,
Two further assumptions are required. First, the number of unauthorized data positively correlates with the number of profitable
such uses (SD Uul,,, -SD Unuuh-prof,) . Since a stricter privacy policy
implies more unauthorized uses, it therefore follows that a more
stringent term implies more profitable such uses. Second, assume
an inverse relationship between the value of the unauthorized data
uses and the number of such uses. The downward sloping line in
Figure 2 captures this relationship. There are therefore fewer unauthorized uses that are very profitable than there are unauthorized uses that are slightly profitable.
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Figure 2 illustrates conditions with two different reservation
prices attached to the same privacy term. The set of unauthorized
uses where the value of the unauthorized use exceeds P, is considerably larger when PR is two dollars than when it is three dollars.
The area between the hash marks under the curve represents the

loss to a collecting agent when,241 for a given privacy term, PR is in241Some sort of marginal gain in terms of credibility probably results from a collect-

ing agent's agreement to pay an increased reservation price, but this analysis does not
incorporate this phenomenon because what ultimately matters here is whether this
marginal increase varies with respect to the stringency of the privacy term. This analysis assumes that because an extra dollar of P, should generally inspire roughly the
same amount of incremental credibility irrespective of how stringently the user has set
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creased from two to three dollars.242 Figure 3 draws these same
curves for two different privacy terms, one that is stringent and one
that is permissive. Recall that because the privacy term divides
data uses into those that are authorized and those that are unauthorized, more permissive terms imply a smaller set of unauthorized uses as depicted in the right side of Figure 3. Because the size
of SD UUna,,, firol,is generally proportional to the size of SD U,, a
more permissive term implies not only a smaller SD Uawauh , but also
a smaller SD Uuinau,hrof,,. The area between the hash marks under the
curve for the permissive term is therefore much smaller than the
analogous area for the stringent term. The loss associated with
formerly profitable data uses being rendered unprofitable with an
increased PR is larger with stringent than with permissive privacy
terms. Similarly, for a fixed PR the total number of unprofitable unauthorized data uses is larger with stringent than with permissive
privacy terms. The upshot of this discussion is that a default PR
schedule that varies with respect to the stringency of the privacy
term should assign lower default PR values to stricter privacy terms
(keeping a greater fraction of potential data uses profitable) and
higher PR values to more permissive ones.243
the cookie-handling privacy term, the discussion regarding which way the scale of defaults should slide with respect to privacy term stringency may ignore this dynamic.
242The lost value derives from two distinct phenomena. First, an additional dollar of
PR would render some formerly profitable data uses unprofitable. Second, the additional dollar of PR would diminish the profit (by a dollar) on each data use that remains profitable.
243One might object that projected collecting agent valuations of privacy terms
should not drive the default settings because such methodology ignores the pattern of
user valuations for that term. Suppose, the argument would go, that users would prefer that lower levels of P, be associated with permissive, not stringent policies. The
answer to this objection resides in the extreme dispersal of user valuations around the
mean V,,,,. A default Preflecting the mean user valuation is, for any single user, more
likely to deviate significantly from that user's actual valuation than is likely, for a
given collecting agent, a default P, reflecting the mean collecting agent valuation to
deviate from that collecting agent's actual valuation. This condition means that setting
the default PR relative to collecting agent preferences, rather than user preferences,
minimizes the likelihood that one of these parties need incur the transaction cost of
adjusting the PR from the default. P, will rarely reflect the actual valuation of a given
user at any level to which it is set, but if it is set in accordance with collecting agent
valuations, at least that class need not request that the Pbe adjusted upon each page
view. This is an assumption and would require empirical verification. Given, however,
that business valuations are driven by economic need rather than subjective preference, they are probably less dispersed than their consumer counterparts.
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A regime incorporating a default PR schedule would be desirable
for a number of reasons.244 First, making explicit a proxy for VUser in
the form of PR would make the threshold for identifying valueadded data uses clearer. When DUVUn,,,,
> PR, the collecting agent
can put data points to net-beneficial use without incurring the risk
of excessive penalty so long as it pays out the reservation price.
Data can therefore flow inexpensively to its highest valued use.
Second, default valuations, set according to a particular schedule, could serve important information-forcing functions. They
would force users with idiosyncratically high privacy valuations to
reveal their preferences. More importantly, they would also force
collecting agents that have particularly high values of SD Uunauthprofit
(meaning they have some special reason to believe they will breach
the term) to reveal this condition by explicitly requesting a lower
PR from the user.
Third, the valuations would diminish the uncertainty associated
with both ceding data and breaching the privacy term. Users would
know how much they would get in the event of a breach and collecting agents would know how much they would have to pay.
Finally, using valuations would effectively check the incentives
for consumers simply to demand as much privacy as they want
without respect to relative value. In certain instances, collecting
agents may refuse to transact (serve a web page) with those browsers demanding both unreasonably stringent privacy terms and exorbitant values for PR. A market with so many technological predicates will no doubt function imperfectly, but it will create
incentives for consumers to relinquish data at their actual reservation prices.
Some commentators would surely object to this solution as one
enabling the forced sale of clickstream data, and Section III.B has
addressed some of these concerns already. The strict notion of a
forced sale is one generally employed in the context of compulsory
licensing-a context in which legislatures identify some price at
which buyers must be able to buy a property right from sellers.245
This condition, however, leaves a market dependent on "property
24 Determining

the absolute value of the default reservation price, in dollar terms, is

beyond the scope of this Note.
245See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1293, 1295 (1996).
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rules" in name only because the compulsory license effectively sets
a standard liability threshold beyond which the buyer may acquire
an entitlement from the seller. The flaws in the analogy should be
obvious. First, the privacy term and the reservation prices would
merely be defaults, whereas the compulsory license rules are mandatory. Users could unconditionally preclude collecting agents
from acquiring their data in at least three ways: (1) They could
change PR from the default setting to one indicating that there may
be no breach of the term (basically, at infinity); (2) they could disable their cookies; or (3) they could stay off the Internet entirely.
The last strategy only sounds harsh if one refuses to acknowledge
that the sacrifice in privacy is the toll users pay to operate cyberspace. To say that a user would never have to relinquish her data
involuntarily is not to say that she would never be expected to
transmit this information in order to secure some measure of reciprocal value. Instead, she would always have a choice as to whether
her privacy is worth whatever she could be getting in exchange.
Moreover, should a user decide that what she is getting in exchange for her information is not worth her sacrifice in privacy, she
could opt for a provider of fungible content that may well compete
in the market by offering more stringent privacy terms. Most users,
of course, would never choose such a radical holdout strategy because, even with perfect information, they would be more than
happy to trade conditional access to their web-surfing habits for
something of value.
C. Enforcing Nanocontracts
The ability to structure these types of nanotransactions for each
piece of clickstream data is not beyond our technological capacity.
Browsers are already equipped with privacy preference menus, and
adding a default valuation functionality requires only the addition
of another field. The primary hurdles to creating this type of market for clickstream data are enforcement-related. What follows are
several related ideas about how enforcement of these nanocontracts might work. The enforcement costs of such a regime would
be substantial, but the same could be said about the costs of administering any legal restrictions.
Collecting agents collect data points on users and store them as
entries in their databases. Each entry has a value for any number of
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fields. A field is a dimension in a database that stores values for a
given variable. As discussed in Part I, the core of clickstream data
fields usually consists of at least a cookie number, an IP address, a
timestamp (time that the page view took place), and something
identifying the page that the user viewed. These cookie "log files"
will generally contain a number of other fields, but each data collector's particular mix depends on the specific business needs of
the collecting agent.
Collecting agents could easily earmark another field for storing
the privacy contract configuration."6 That field would consist of (1)
the privacy term negotiated between the user's browser and the
collecting agent's server and (2) P, The costs of writing and storing
this data are not insignificant, but they would not represent an inordinate expenditure.247 Moreover, collecting agents destroy data
when it is no longer useful, and the usefulness of the privacy configuration expires at the same time as does the usefulness of the associated data point.
The difficult part of this scheme, as with any other, is detecting
breaches since each page view generates a nanocontract. Luckily,
market constraints make the task a little less daunting. Business
transactions in cookie data are not concerned with one data point.
The market value of a clickstream data point is infinitesimal, so
collecting agents make money by using or transacting for millions
of these points together. One could therefore use sampling methodology to minimize auditing costs. By auditing only a fraction of
the data, an auditor could determine (with a substantial degree of
certainty) whether a collecting agent has violated a privacy term.
Ideally, database owners should have to open their databases to
a central auditor-one that is either public or that is commissioned
by the government-in order to assure that, in the event they
breach the privacy term, they comply with the statutory mechanism
for returning to the user PR If the privacy term constrains the use
2

"See Thibadeau, supra note 116.
of storing data are substantial, and for larger data miners, adding two fields
may not be the optimal strategy for linking privacy configurations with data points.
An alternate strategy would be to store the privacy configurations of every user in a
different table, and to query that table anytime the data is audited. That way, if a collecting agent sees the same cookie fifty times, it need not store that cookie's configuration fifty times as well. Obviously date parameters are important, as users may
change their preferences over time, but the author will ignore that here.
247Costs
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to which a collecting agent may put a piece of data, such as forbidding it to link a cookie number with personal information, auditors
could easily detect that violation by looking at existing tables and
recorded searches.248 Moreover, if the privacy term prohibits sale to
other searching agents, that condition may be detected simply by
footing the name of the agent being audited with the name of the
original data collector, which data miners can easily embed in the
privacy configuration.24" In this context, the Orwell metaphor does
online privacy a disservice, since central auditing of clickstream
data exchange may be far less expensive than competition among
auditing agents. 50
This Note has at times referred to the privacy agreement between a user's browser and the collecting agent's server as a nanocontract. Although the legal paradigm seeks to enforce the agreement by requiring compensation equivalent to that of an
expectation measure familiar to anyone who has taken first-year
contracts, the scheme may actually work most efficiently with a system of regulatory penalties or fines triggered when the collecting
agent fails to return to the user her reservation price. The penalties
could be calibrated to accomplish the objectives set forth in Part III
without requiring that injured users pursue individual contract
claims. Instead of punishing the breach itself, a regulatory agent,
perhaps the FTC,' should sanction the failure to return to the user
or a relevant substitute (discussed below) the reservationprice embedded in the nanocontract.A sufficiently substantial criminal penalty could diminish the necessity for exhaustive auditing. The penalty, conceptually equivalent to D, in the preceding analysis, need
only be set high enough such that the expected loss from violating
248

Expert computer science auditors can quickly audit vast quantities of data. See,

e.g., In re Pharmatrak, Inc., 329 F.2d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2003) (describing how the plaintiff's expert witness was able to conduct a thorough audit of the defendant's log files
in a matter of hours).
241 See Thibadeau, supra note 116.
2" An argument for the superiority of a central auditing agent in the context of content ratings is presented in Thomas B. Nachbar, Paradox and Structure: Relying on
Government Regulation to Preserve the Internet's Unregulated Character, 85 Minn.
L. Rev. 215,270-87 (2000).
2' See Volokh, supra note 12, at 1060 ("Though breach of contract has traditionally
been seen as a purely private wrong, to be remedied through a private lawsuit, it's
similar enough.., to fraud or false advertising that there's nothing startling about...

the Federal Trade Commission prosecuting some such breaches itself.").
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the privacy term and not paying P, to the user (the probability of
getting caught times the magnitude of the sanction) is greater than
the value of P, itself. Mathematically speaking, DE need only be
substantial enough such that those damages times the likelihood of
getting caught, PDetecton' renders a decision to breach the privacy
term without paying to the user PR an inferior strategy to paying P,
voluntarily. In this context, the precise value of DE is not as important as it was in a prophylactic scheme as, again, it need only be
large enough so that PDetection * DE > PR The margin by which the left
side of the equation exceeds the right matters less than in a regime
that penalized violation of the privacy term itself. Penalizing the
failure to pay rather than a breach of the term could significantly
diminish auditing costs because the enforcing agency could afford
to implement a regulatory structure with a very low PDeec,,on so long
as DE would be sufficiently high to make compensating, in the
event of a violation, the more profitable strategy (as compared to
not compensating).
After a collecting agent violates user expectations, some value
must be exacted from the violator and some value must be remitted to the consumer. Were there no transaction costs these values
should be equal both to each other and to PR (and, for that matter,
Vuser). The most significant transaction costs in this regulatory
framework would involve returning money to the injured user. On
the one hand, if the violator bears too much transaction cost, the
scheme would fail to achieve the utility objective because collecting
agents will not be able to make unauthorized uses of data with values that exceed PR* On the other hand, if users bear too much
transaction cost, the scheme would fail to achieve the compensatory objective because users would receive too much less than Vser .
If each violation required a separate check to be issued directly to
the user, the transaction costs could stifle, rather than stimulate,
Internet use.
The problem involved in inexpensively returning PR to consumers is something of a paradox because the very subject of the transaction, privacy, can prevent violators from knowing the identity of
the person from whom they collected the data.252 There may be a
252See Thibadeau, supra note 116 (identifying problems that inhere in a system of
identifying privacy violations involving data that is supposed to be anonymous).
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way around this unique problem. Two of the fields that collecting
agents routinely store are a user's IP address and a timestamp. Local Area Networks ("LAN"s) and Internet Service Providers
("ISP"s) can generally identify the account associated with values
for these two fields, using a procedure called a "reverse IP
lookup. ' '253 Violators should have to transfer the sum of all reserva-

tion prices for violated nanocontracts to the ISP or LAN that owns
the IP address. Violators could also transfer timestamps of the
compromised data so the LAN or ISP can attribute the violation to
a particular account. ISPs and LANs generally retain information
about which account was using a particular IP address at a particular time. If the failure of these entities to retain this information
becomes a problem, then the regulatory framework could simply
require them to do so.
Orchestrating a system that can identify the users whose terms
are violated, however, is only half of the enforcement solution. The
other half involves returning to them some value approximating PR
without incurring excessive check-cutting costs. Fortunately, users
have some established relationship to their ISPs or LANs. Most
users that maintain accounts with ISPs pay these service providers
periodically and most users that are on LANs either have similar
accounts or are employed by the entity that deploys the LAN. In
any of these circumstances, the user and the ISP/LAN owner exchange money periodically. The periodic monetary exchange could
account for the money the ISP/LAN received from the violator
without requiring any additional bill or check-PR may simply be
embedded as a line-item in a statement or a paycheck. Realistically, there are transaction costs associated with processing, but
this method may represent one way of getting the "check cost" to a
sufficiently low level that costs of administration do not cannibalize
any benefits associated with increased fidelity to privacy terms and
gains from socially desirable data usage. 5'

2' "Reverse IP lookup" is a fancy name for a simple procedure. The LANs and ISPs
can just associate the timestamp and the IP address recorded in the clickstream data
with the account their records show using that IP address at that time.
...
Processing costs associated with paying LANs/ISPs would be smaller than those
associated with paying users directly because there are, by many orders of magnitude,
more users than there are LANs and ISPs.
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One objection may be that this seems to vest ISPs and LANs
with exactly the type of control over personal information that the
scheme seeks to wrest from the collecting agents. This is not a
problem, however, because ISPs would not know what the user
viewed, but only that the collecting agent violated the associated
nanocontract. Knowledge regarding nothing more than whether a
violation occurs is not particularly sensitive information.
Another objection may involve imperfect administration. Many
different users, for example, may use the same computer on a
LAN. The circumstances creating these enforcement difficulties,
however, are the same ones that render unauthorized clickstream
data use utterly inoffensive. Using the multiple-user example, there
is little privacy violation if the "dossier" associated with the cookie
reflects the surfing habits of a hundred different undergraduates at
a public terminal. There may be other circumstances where, although a violation can be associated with a particular computer,
one may not be able to associate a relationship between that box
and a person. As the example illustrates, if one cannot associate a
cookie profile (which is a property of a computer) with a person,
then there exists little invasion of privacy at all.
In sum, any viable legal solution to the clickstream privacy controversy must involve some sort of centrally organized auditing.
Otherwise, only in rare circumstances will violations inflict sufficiently large and concentrated user losses to induce people to bring
claims. Absent transaction costs, one would almost always want a
legal regime to protect, where possible, a highly differentiated set
of preferences for privacy without suffocating socially desirable
transactions for the underlying information. Although user valuations are highly differentiated, they are small enough that even
relatively minor administrative costs can render the underlying
transactions not worth the trouble. The advent of new browser
technology, however, allows users to communicate almost costlessly their expectations to collecting agents and could just as
easily be configured to communicate their privacy valuations as
well. Leveraging current contractual relationships between
LANs/ISPs and users may provide a channel for returning to the
consumer her reservation price at a sufficiently low administrative
expense so as to make such a scheme more desirable than enforcing prophylactic standards.
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CONCLUSION

Companies will continue to invent new ways to use data, and, as
a consequence, they will inevitably invent new ways to collect it.
The stakes are simply too high to treat every informational privacy
concern as a facsimile of the concerns coming before it. It is perhaps a collective social skepticism towards "newfangled technology" that militates against piecemeal, non-holistic approaches to
online privacy reform. Perhaps this same sentiment fuels the desire
to treat modern privacy concerns as though the law may easily address them using existing ways of thinking about informational privacy.
Although the term "privacy" may assume a number of deontic
meanings, given the character of clickstream data collection it may
well be the case that none of these conceptualizations adequately
captures the appropriate way of thinking about information exchange. The intensity with which a user values privacy varies significantly within the Internet population, and a scheme that seeks
to impose a uniform, prophylactic privacy standard therefore paradoxically protects clickstream informational privacy too much and,
at the same time, not enough. Lawmakers can leverage existing
browser technology to force users to reveal the intensity of their
privacy preference, and they can leverage users' existing relationships with LANs and ISPs to compensate those whose preferences
have been violated. Up until now, the law has struggled to generate
possibilities other than prophylactic standards for clickstream data
regulation. The law now stands on sufficiently sound technical
footing to implement a solution acknowledging different preference intensity without incurring transaction costs suffocating all social gains associated with a market for clickstream data.
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